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part of the year (May to August). In fact, it rained about two out of every three days during the months of June and July, with June having a better than 40 per cent chance of experiencing three or more consecutive days, and even a 25 per cent chance of having at least an entire week, of rain.
In a largely undeveloped place like Hong Kong during the war, heavy rains falling on land usually translated into mud. Thus far in the war, both sides had already experienced the difficulty of moving across mud in various theatres. In Hong Kong, only the urban areas had all-weather roads, so its roads and terrain outside of the urban areas were trafficable only during periods of dry weather.10
Then one must remember that 75 per cent of Hong Kong was mountain. By the nature of their sloped sides and rocky terrain, mountains are already difficult to traverse in good weather. In times of bad weather, mountains are even harder to negotiate, especially if they have been stripped of vegetation. This was the case with Hong Kong during the Japanese occupation. As the war dragged on, supply shortages of everything became acute. Whereas coal was the preferred fuel for industrial and residential use, the increasing difficulty of importing this item into Hong Kong forced people to switch to firewood. This resulted in the felling of trees throughout the territory, thus depriving the mountains of the foliage that anchored their soil, and increasing the chances of erosion and landslides.
Machinery was the epitome of the Allied arsenal, and embodied from its factories, to its logistical functions, and finally to the fighting machines on the frontline. But machinery was also very susceptible to the weather. In Hong Kong, with its high rainfall and lack of all-weather roads outside of the city, construction activities would be needed to improve its roads for the vehicle-oriented Allies. But construction would be curtailed during periods of heavy rainfall.
Without a suitable system of roads, the Allies would be unable to take full advantage of their superior mechanised transport in Hong Kong. The necessity of supporting China with a strong LoC inland from Hong Kong would have taxed its inadequate roads past their limit. Estimates for the portion of supplies landed each day that could be transported inland to support the Chinese amounted to no more than 25 per cent,
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part of the year (May to August). In fact, it rained about two out of every three days during the months of June and July, with June having a better than 40 per cent chance of experiencing three or more consecutive days, and even a 25 per cent chance of having at least an entire week, of rain.
In a largely undeveloped place like Hong Kong during the war, heavy rains falling on land usually translated into mud. Thus far in the war, both sides had already experienced the difficulty of moving across mud in various theatres. In Hong Kong, only the urban areas had all- weather roads, so its roads and terrain outside of the urban areas were trafficable only during periods of dry weather.10
Then one must remember that 75 per cent of Hong Kong was mountain. By the nature of their sloped sides and rocky terrain, mountains are already difficult to traverse in good weather. In times of bad weather, mountains are even harder to negotiate, especially if they have been stripped of vegetation. This was the case with Hong Kong during the Japanese occupation. As the war dragged on, supply shortages of everything became acute. Whereas coal was the preferred fuel for industrial and residential use, the increasing difficulty of importing this item into Hong Kong forced people to switch to firewood. This resulted in the felling of trees throughout the territory, thus depriving the mountains of the foliage that anchored their soil, and increasing the chances of erosion and landslides."
Machinery was the epitome of the Allied arsenal, and embodied from its factories, to its logistical functions, and finally to the fighting machines on the frontline. But machinery was also very susceptible to the weather. In Hong Kong, with its high rainfall and lack of all-weather roads outside of the city, construction activities would be needed to improve its roads for the vehicle-oriented Allies. But construction would be curtailed during periods of heavy rainfall.
Without a suitable system of roads, the Allies would be unable to take full advantage of their superior mechanised transport in Hong Kong. The necessity of supporting China with a strong LoC inland from Hong Kong would have taxed its inadequate roads past their limit. Estimates for the portion of supplies landed each day that could be transported inland to support the Chinese amounted to no more than 25 per cent,
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