RAS-1998 — Page 144

RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 All AI Reviewed

107

WEAPONS OF THE CHINA WARS

RICHARD J. GARRETT

One of the remarkable features of the nineteenth century China wars was the ability of a relatively small force of European soldiers and sailors to overcome a numerically superior Chinese force. Just as in the recent Gulf War, where Saddam Hussein's dream of a 'mother of all wars' was shattered by high tech. weaponry, so one of the factors which made the difference was, undoubtedly, the vast difference in the military technology available to each side. It was not the only factor, but it is necessary to understand it to arrive at a clear picture of the China wars.

It is worth dismissing any idea that the quality of the fighting men was inferior. There are many instances of troops fighting to the death and refusing to surrender.1 Indeed, to the European mind some of these heroics seemed foolish, just as they could not understand why people committed suicide rather than fall into the hands of the 'barbarians.'2 Captain Loch R.N. remarks that "I feel persuaded that, if drilled under English officers, they would prove equal, if not superior, to the Sepoys; they have greater physical power, greater obstinacy, and consequently minds that retain impressions with greater tenacity, and would be slow to lose confidence after it was once built upon the foundations of their vanity."3 It was not that the officers were cowards, as many of the Mandarins died bravely, but rather there was no conception of the need for the troops to be trained to act together as a whole. Mackenzie, an officer present during the first war, notes: "As yet, I imagine that no field exercise and evolutions have been compiled for the use of the Chinese Army. Neither do the troops, as far as I observed, move in concert, nor do they make any formation in bodies."5 Although the Manchu armies had been an efficient fighting force at the time of the conquest, two centuries later they neglected to maintain rigorous training programmes.

The European officers, on the other hand, put a lot of effort into exercising their men. An example of this is recorded by Lord Jocelyn: "During our stay in Singapore the seamen of the flag-ship Wellesley were exercised on shore, under the supervision of the commanding...

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107 WEAPONS OF THE CHINA WARS RICHARD J. GARRETT One of the remarkable features of the nineteenth century China wars was the ability of a relatively small force of European soldiers and sailors to overcome a numerically superior Chinese force. Just as in the recent Gulf War, where Saddam Hussein's dream of a 'mother of all wars' was shattered by high tech. weaponry, so one of the factors which made the difference was, undoubtedly, the vast difference in the military technology available to each side. It was not the only factor, but it is necessary to understand it to arrive at a clear picture of the China wars. It is worth dismissing any idea that the quality of the fighting men was inferior. There are many instances of troops fighting to the death and refusing to surrender.1 Indeed, to the European mind some of these heroics seemed foolish, just as they could not understand why people committed suicide rather than fall into the hands of the 'barbarians.'2 Captain Loch R.N. remarks that "I feel persuaded that, if drilled under English officers, they would prove equal, if not superior, to the Sepoys; they have greater physical power, greater obstinacy, and consequently minds that retain impressions with greater tenacity, and would be slow to lose confidence after it was once built upon the foundations of their vanity."3 It was not that the officers were cowards, as many of the Mandarins died bravely, but rather there was no conception of the need for the troops to be trained to act together as a whole. Mackenzie, an officer present during the first war, notes: "As yet, I imagine that no field exercise and evolutions have been compiled for the use of the Chinese Army. Neither do the troops, as far as I observed, move in concert, nor do they make any formation in bodies."5 Although the Manchu armies had been an efficient fighting force at the time of the conquest, two centuries later they neglected to maintain rigorous training programmes. The European officers, on the other hand, put a lot of effort into exercising their men. An example of this is recorded by Lord Jocelyn: "During our stay in Singapore the seamen of the flag-ship Wellesley were exercised on shore, under the supervision of the commanding...
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107 WEAPONS OF THE CHINA WARS RICHARD J. GARRETT One of the remarkable features of the nineteenth century China wars was the ability of a relatively small force of European soldiers and sailors to overcome a numerically superior Chinese force. Just as in the recent Gulf War, where Saddam Hussein's dream of a 'mother of all wars' was shattered by high tech. weaponry, so one of the factors which made the difference was, undoubtedly, the vast difference in the military technology available to each side. It was not the only factor, but it is necessary to understand it to arrive at a clear picture of the China wars. It is worth dismissing any idea that the quality of the fighting men was inferior. There are many instances of troops fighting to the death and refusing to surrender.' Indeed, to the European mind some of these heroics seemed foolish, just as they could not understand why people committed suicide rather than fall into the hands of the 'barbarians.'2 Captain Loch R.N. remarks that "I feel persuaded that, if drilled under English officers, they would prove equal, if not superior, to the Sepoys; they have greater physical power, greater obstinacy, and consequently minds that retain impressions with greater tenacity, and would be slow to lose confidence after it was once built upon the foundations of their vanity." 3 It was not that the officers were cowards, as many of the Mandarins died bravely, but rather there was no conception of the need for the troops to be trained to act together as a whole. Mackenzie, an officer present during the first war, notes: "As yet, I imagine that no field exercise and evolutions have been compiled for the use of the Chinese Army. Neither do the troops as far as I observed, move in concert, nor do they make any formation in bodies." 5 Although the Manchu armies had been an efficient fighting force at the time of the conquest, two centuries later they neglected to maintain rigorous train- ing programmes. The European officers, on the other hand, put a lot of effort into exercising their men. An example of this is recorded by Lord Jocelyn: "During our stay in Singapore the seamen of the flag-ship Wellesley were exercised on shore, under the supervision of the commanding
2026-05-13 09:20:05 · Baseline
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107

WEAPONS OF THE CHINA WARS

RICHARD J. GARRETT

One of the remarkable features of the nineteenth century China wars was the ability of a relatively small force of European soldiers and sailors to overcome a numerically superior Chinese force. Just as in the recent Gulf War, where Saddam Hussein's dream of a 'mother of all wars' was shattered by high tech. weaponry, so one of the factors which made the difference was, undoubtedly, the vast difference in the military technology available to each side. It was not the only factor, but it is necessary to understand it to arrive at a clear picture of the China wars.

It is worth dismissing any idea that the quality of the fighting men was inferior. There are many instances of troops fighting to the death and refusing to surrender.' Indeed, to the European mind some of these heroics seemed foolish, just as they could not understand why people committed suicide rather than fall into the hands of the 'barbarians.'2 Captain Loch R.N. remarks that "I feel persuaded that, if drilled under English officers, they would prove equal, if not superior, to the Sepoys; they have greater physical power, greater obstinacy, and consequently minds that retain impressions with greater tenacity, and would be slow to lose confidence after it was once built upon the foundations of their vanity." 3 It was not that the officers were cowards, as many of the Mandarins died bravely, but rather there was no conception of the need for the troops to be trained to act together as a whole. Mackenzie, an officer present during the first war, notes: "As yet, I imagine that no field exercise and evolutions have been compiled for the use of the Chinese Army. Neither do the troops as far as I observed, move in concert, nor do they make any formation in bodies." 5 Although the Manchu armies had been an efficient fighting force at the time of the conquest, two centuries later they neglected to maintain rigorous train- ing programmes.

The European officers, on the other hand, put a lot of effort into exercising their men. An example of this is recorded by Lord Jocelyn: "During our stay in Singapore the seamen of the flag-ship Wellesley were exercised on shore, under the supervision of the commanding

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