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The Szechuan Force, of five corps with a total of thirty-three battalions* [i.e. 18-20,000 men] to start with, had two brigades up to full strength, the An-ting Brigade and the Ko-i Brigade [the latter with fifteen and a half battalions]. Mesny was located with the headquarters of the Ko-i Brigade during most of the campaign as a foreign adviser to the C-in-C of the Force on the use and maintenance of foreign arms. His descriptions of skirmishes between the Imperial troops and the Miao tribesmen reflect this limitation, being restricted to what he saw for himself and information he was able to gather within both the C-in-C's and the Ko-i Brigade Headquarters.
The first location of the headquarters of the Ko-i Brigade referred to by Mesny was Niu-ch'ang, though it moved forward shortly afterwards towards the old city of Huang-p'ing Chou. The vanguard advanced to Ma-ping-bah, occupying a Miao camp where the Szechuan Force planned to spend the winter of 1868/9. Shortly after this, Mesny moved to Huang-p'ing Chou, and described a skirmish at Ta-ngai, followed the next day by a full-scale battle at Huang-p'ing itself.
Just before Chinese New Year in 1869, the Ko-i Brigade despatched a reconnaissance party in the direction of the Miao headquarters at Hsin-chou [Huang-p'ing New Town] some ten miles further into tribal Kueichou beyond the old city of Huang-p'ing. They discovered that the Miao had left only a small body of men in the town, having withdrawn their headquarters to Wu-ku Lung. The day after the New Year, a large body of Miao rebels descended from the hills and fired on the Imperial camp at Huang-p'ing but were driven off by the Ko-i Guards Regiment.
Regionalism and factionalism were two powerful factors influencing the inter-personal relationships between members of the various Forces involved in the Kueichou campaign. In order to achieve anything, one had to rely on personal connections. Mesny, who did not hide his partisan views, repeats again and again how unfairly his Commander-in-Chief, T'ang Chiung, had been treated both in rewards for good service and in support, both financial and matériel [both of which were withheld]. Jealousy between the commanders of the various forces caused not only disharmony but, if Mesny is to be believed and there is no reason to doubt him, the failure of the whole of the first campaign. One of China's cultural characteristics was reflected in a number of instances referred to in Mesny's narrative. Personal relationships and connections, 'squeeze', and deep concern for one's self to the detriment of others were the
71
The Szechuan Force, of five corps with a total of thirty three battalions* [i.e. 18-20,000 men] to start with, had two brigades up to full strength, the An-ting Brigade and the Ko-i Brigade [the latter with fifteen and a half battalions]. Mesny was located with the headquarters of the Ko-i Brigade during most of the campaign as a foreign adviser to the C-in-C of the Force on the use and maintenance of foreign arms. His descriptions of skirmishes between the Imperial troops and the Miao tribesmen reflect this limitation, being restricted to what he saw for himself and information he was able to gather within both the C-in-C's and the Ko-i Brigade Headquarters.
The first location of the headquarters of the Ko-i Brigade referred the by Mesny was Niu-ch'ang though it moved forward shortly afterwards towards the old city of Huang-p'ing Chou. The vanguard advanced to Ma-ping-bah, occupying a Miao camp where the Szechuan Force planned to spend the winter of 1868/9. Shortly after this Mesny moved to Huang- p'ing Chou, and described a skirmish at Ta-ngai, followed the next day by a full-scale battle at Huang-p'ing itself.
Just before Chinese New Year in 1869 the Ko-i Brigade despatched a reconnaissance party in the direction of the Miao headquarters at Hsin- chou [Huang-p'ing New Town] some ten miles further into tribal Kueichou beyond the old city of Huang-p'ing. They discovered that the Miao had left only a small body of men in the town having withdrawn their headquarters to Wu-ku Lung. The day after the New Year a large body of Miao rebels descended from the hills and fired on the Imperial camp at Huang-P'ing but were driven off by the Ko-i Guards Regiment.
Regionalism and factionalism were two powerful factors influencing the inter-personal relationships between members of the various Forces involved in the Kueichou campaign. In order to achieve anything one had to rely on personal connections. Mesny, who did not hide his partisan views, repeats again and again how unfairly his Commander-in-Chief, T'ang Chiung, had been treated both in rewards for good service and in support both financial and matériel [both of which were withheld]. Jealousy between the commanders of the various forces caused not only disharmony but, if Mesny is to be believed and there is no reason to doubt him, the failure of the whole of the first campaign. One of China's cultural characteristics was reflected in a number of instances referred 10 in Mesny's narrative. Personal relationships and connections, 'squeeze' and deep concern for one's self to the detriment of others were the
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