RAS-1991 — Page 196

RASHKB Journal 皇家亞洲學會香港分會學刊 All AI Reviewed

176

guerillas with whom we had our connections were not the so-called “communist" guerillas of the North West. They were right-wing guerillas; in fact the largest and most effective group were under the direct orders of Tai Li.

As can be seen from the Map, our school was well placed to receive teams for training from all the guerilla areas of operation in the delta. If we imagine a clock of which the school was the centre, 200 kilometres away at 11 o'clock was Wuhu; 300 kilometres away at 12 o'clock was Nanking, at 12.30 Chinkiang, and at 1 o'clock Soochow. Shanghai stood at 2 o'clock, 400 kilometres away, and Hangchow at 3 o'clock only 100 kilometres away.*

The second course finished in November. At about this time I received a signal from Chungking to say that in place of the British troops, who had returned to India, the Chinese authorities had asked the British to open another school on the same lines as ours, under general X......., and asking my views of a suitable establishment; it was thought that General X... would be moving over in our direction. Later still I heard that the new school was to be established far away in an area remote from any targets. I knew that our success had thrived on the close contact we had been able to maintain, owing to our location, with our teams and the quick news we received of their successes, and they in their turn derived encouragement from our proximity and the advice we could give them at short notice with any special problems. I felt that in the absence of targets the new school could have none of those successes that had meant so much to us; and when later still we were ordered to move our school to amalgamate with the new school the situation became incomprehensible. It looked as if our teams were to be left in the air and a whole year's work wasted. The frontline generals with whom we had developed most cordial relations thought it was by our own wish we were leaving and inundated us with letters requesting us to stay.

In the meantime the third course had commenced. It included fewer teams of regular soldiers and more guerilla teams than either of the first two courses, possibly as a consequence of the growing better understanding of our work amongst the forward generals. At the end of each course we held competitions and offered small prizes to the teams who

* Very approximately

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176 guerillas with whom we had our connections were not the so-called “communist" guerillas of the North West. They were right-wing guerillas; in fact the largest and most effective group were under the direct orders of Tai Li. As can be seen from the Map, our school was well placed to receive teams for training from all the guerilla areas of operation in the delta. If we imagine a clock of which the school was the centre, 200 kilometres away at 11 o'clock was Wuhu; 300 kilometres away at 12 o'clock was Nanking, at 12.30 Chinkiang, and at 1 o'clock Soochow. Shanghai stood at 2 o'clock, 400 kilometres away, and Hangchow at 3 o'clock only 100 kilometres away.* The second course finished in November. At about this time I received a signal from Chungking to say that in place of the British troops, who had returned to India, the Chinese authorities had asked the British to open another school on the same lines as ours, under general X......., and asking my views of a suitable establishment; it was thought that General X... would be moving over in our direction. Later still I heard that the new school was to be established far away in an area remote from any targets. I knew that our success had thrived on the close contact we had been able to maintain, owing to our location, with our teams and the quick news we received of their successes, and they in their turn derived encouragement from our proximity and the advice we could give them at short notice with any special problems. I felt that in the absence of targets the new school could have none of those successes that had meant so much to us; and when later still we were ordered to move our school to amalgamate with the new school the situation became incomprehensible. It looked as if our teams were to be left in the air and a whole year's work wasted. The frontline generals with whom we had developed most cordial relations thought it was by our own wish we were leaving and inundated us with letters requesting us to stay. In the meantime the third course had commenced. It included fewer teams of regular soldiers and more guerilla teams than either of the first two courses, possibly as a consequence of the growing better understanding of our work amongst the forward generals. At the end of each course we held competitions and offered small prizes to the teams who * Very approximately
Baseline (Original)
176 guerillas with whom we had our connections were not the so-called “communist" guerillas of the North West. They were right-wing guerillas; in fact the largest and most effective group were under the direct orders of Tai Li. As can be seen from the Map, our school was well placed to receive teams for training from all the guerilla areas of operation in the delta. If we imagine a clock of which the school was the centre, 200 kilometres away at 11 o'clock was Wuhu; 300 kilometres away at 12 o'clock was Nanking, at 12.30 Chinkiang, and at 1 o'clock Soochow. Shanghai stood at 2 o'clock, 400 kilometres away, and Hangchow at 3 o'clock only 100 kilometres away.* The second course finished in November. At about this time I received a signal from Chungking to say that in place of the British troops, who had returned to India, the Chinese authorities had asked the British to open another school on the same lines as ours, under general X......., and asking my views of a suitable establishment; it was thought that General X... would be moving over in our direction. Later still I heard that the new school was to be established far away in an area remote from any targets. I knew that our success had thrived on the close contact we had been able to maintain, owing to our location, with our teams and the quick news we received of their successes, and they in their turn derived encouragement from our proximity and the advice we could give them at short notice with any special problems. I felt that in the absence of targets the new school could have none of those successes that had meant so much to us; and when later still we were ordered to move our school to amalgamate with the new school the situation became incomprehensible. It looked as if our teams were to be left in the air and a whole year's work wasted. The frontline generals with whom we had developed most cordial relations thought it was by our own wish we were leaving and inundated us with letters requesting us to stay. In the meantime the third course had commenced. It included fewer teams of regular soldiers and more guerilla teams then either of the first two courses, possibly as a consequence of the growing better under- standing of our work amongst the forward generals. At the end of each course we held competitions and offered small prizes to the teams who * Very approximately [Editor] :
2026-05-13 06:44:37 · Baseline
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176

guerillas with whom we had our connections were not the so-called “communist" guerillas of the North West. They were right-wing guerillas; in fact the largest and most effective group were under the direct orders of Tai Li.

As can be seen from the Map, our school was well placed to receive teams for training from all the guerilla areas of operation in the delta. If we imagine a clock of which the school was the centre, 200 kilometres away at 11 o'clock was Wuhu; 300 kilometres away at 12 o'clock was Nanking, at 12.30 Chinkiang, and at 1 o'clock Soochow. Shanghai stood at 2 o'clock, 400 kilometres away, and Hangchow at 3 o'clock only 100 kilometres away.*

The second course finished in November. At about this time I received a signal from Chungking to say that in place of the British troops, who had returned to India, the Chinese authorities had asked the British to open another school on the same lines as ours, under general X......., and asking my views of a suitable establishment; it was thought that General X... would be moving over in our direction. Later still I heard that the new school was to be established far away in an area remote from any targets. I knew that our success had thrived on the close contact we had been able to maintain, owing to our location, with our teams and the quick news we received of their successes, and they in their turn derived encouragement from our proximity and the advice we could give them at short notice with any special problems. I felt that in the absence of targets the new school could have none of those successes that had meant so much to us; and when later still we were ordered to move our school to amalgamate with the new school the situation became incomprehensible. It looked as if our teams were to be left in the air and a whole year's work wasted. The frontline generals with whom we had developed most cordial relations thought it was by our own wish we were leaving and inundated us with letters requesting us to stay.

In the meantime the third course had commenced. It included fewer teams of regular soldiers and more guerilla teams then either of the first two courses, possibly as a consequence of the growing better under- standing of our work amongst the forward generals. At the end of each course we held competitions and offered small prizes to the teams who

* Very approximately [Editor]

:

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