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RICHARD J. SMITH
against a more aggressive enemy.82 Furthermore, in the absence of strict discipline and competent middle-grade officers, the elaborate military evolutions of the parade ground could not be preserved on the battlefield, Chinese tactics were often absurdly simple, or outlandishly naive. One general reportedly planned to arm his men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the advancing Japanese, whereupon they would be attacked by spearmen.84 Chinese commanders were continually baffled by Japanese tactics, indicating a general lack of acquaintance with even the rudiments of modern warfare. A pincer attack by the Japanese, which threatened the rear of Chinese troops, was almost invariably successful. Even when solidly entrenched and well-armed, Ch'ing forces seldom held their ground for as long as they should have.85 Demoralization and lack of leadership were the root causes.
Another serious problem was the almost incredibly poor marksmanship of the Chinese in rifle and artillery fire.86 This problem was unquestionably related to inadequate training and discipline, and false economy in drill. During the war there were numerous reports of naval officers being thrown off the bridge by the concussion from their own guns, indicating either the lack of regular practice, the failure of superior officers to supervise gun drill, or both.87 The military commander-in-chief at Shan-hai-kuan undoubtedly spoke for many commanders in informing the British military attaché that he did not believe in musketry instruction for all his troops, since "it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each ying [battalion] to pick off the Japanese officers."88 In the early defense of Wei-hai-wei, Liu Ch'ao-p'ei of the Anhwei Army resorted to newly-mounted quick-firing cannon only after two of his older, less effective pieces had jammed.89 In the absence of adequate leadership and training, the Chinese found, contrary to normal experience in war, that although they were on the defensive most of the time, and usually had numerical superiority, they almost invariably suffered much heavier casualties than the Japanese. According to one estimate, China lost over 56,000 men in the fighting to Japan's paltry 4,117.90
At sea the situation was little better. Although Admiral Ting, a former Anhwei Army cavalry officer, won the praise of virtually all foreign observers, the Peiyang navy proved totally incapable of contending with the Japanese fleet. At the battle off the mouth of
28
RICHARD J. SMITH
against a more aggressive enemy.82 Furthermore, in the absence of strict discipline and competent middle-grade officers, the elaborate military evolutions of the parade ground could not be preserved on the battleleld, Chinese tactics were often absurdly simple, or out- landishly naive. One general reportedly planned to arm his men with bags of pepper to be thrown in the faces of the advancing Japanese, whereupon they would be attacked by spearmen,84 Chinese commanders were continually baffled by Japanese tactics, indicating a general lack of acquaintance with even the rudiments of modern warfare. A pincer attack by the Japanese, which threa- tened the rear of Chinese troops, was almost invariably successful. Even when solidly entrenched and well-armed, Ch'ing forces seldom held their ground for as long as they should have.85 Demoraliza- tion and lack of leadership were the root causes.
Another serious problem was the almost incredibly poor mark- smanship of the Chinese in rifle and artillery fire 86 This problem was unquestionably related to inadequate training and discipline, and false economy in drill. During the war there were numerous reports of naval officers being thrown off the bridge by the concus- sion from their own guns, indicating either the lack of regular prac- tice, the failure of superior officers to supervise gun drill, or both.87 The military commander-in-chief at Shan-hai-kuan undoubtedly spoke for many commanders in informing the British military attaché that he did not believe in musketry instruction for all his troops, since "it was quite sufficient to have ten good shots in each ying [battalion] to pick off the Japanese officers."88 In the early defense of Wei-hai-wei, Liu Ch'ao-p'ei of the Anhwei Army resorted to newly-mounted quick-firing cannon only after two of his older, less effective pieces had jammed.89 In the absence of adequate leadership and training, the Chinese found, contrary to normal experience in war, that although they were on the defensive most of the time, and usually had numerical superiority, they almost invariably suffered much heavier casualties than the Japanese. Ac- cording to one estimate, China lost over 56,000 men in the fighting to Japan's paltry 4,117,90
At sea the situation was little better. Although Admiral Ting. a former Anhwei Army cavalry officer, won the praise of virtually all foreign observers, the Peiyang navy proved totally incapable of contending with the Japanese fleet. At the battle off the mouth of
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