MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895
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basis for progress reports to the throne.58 In 1890, a specialized program of instruction in railroad engineering was introduced, although no information exists on the total number of students involved.59
Periodically, students from the Tientsin Military Academy were sent to Port Arthur and Shan-hai-kuan for practical training in infantry, cavalry, and artillery units.60 In addition, cadets at the school occasionally gained actual battle experience, notably in 1891 against rebel forces at Jehol and elsewhere. According to Li Hung-chang, the experiment was quite successful.61 Only one group of Tientsin academy cadets went abroad: In 1889, Li sent Tuan Ch'i-jui, Wu Ting-yüan, Shang Te-ch'üan, Kung Ch'ing-t'ang, and T'eng Yü-tsao to Germany for advanced study. After a year of military academy instruction in Berlin combined with advanced training at the Krupp gunworks in Essen, the students returned to China.62
Like the Tientsin Naval Academy, established by Li in 1880, the Tientsin Military Academy was financed by the shrinking Pei-yang maritime defense account.63 In all, the money was reasonably well-spent, but, as Wang Chia-chien has indicated, the academy suffered from a variety of administrative, financial, and other problems (including difficulties with foreign employees), many of which also plagued the few other military and naval training facilities of the period.64
Nonetheless, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, China appeared to have built a respectable military and naval organization. In fact, when conflict between China and Japan seemed likely, most Westerners gave the strategic edge to China.65 But the illusion of China's superiority on land and sea was quickly shattered by Japan's rapid drive into Korea, Manchuria, and China Proper. Judiciously combining land and sea operations, the Japanese completely overwhelmed the diverse Chinese military forces sent to resist them.66 Throughout the war, reports from British, French, and other foreign observers repeatedly praised the Japanese for their able strategy and tactics, effective training, tight discipline, valor, esprit de corps, and the excellence of their support facilities. No such praise was forthcoming for China.67
The Sino-Japanese War illustrated with striking clarity the bankruptcy of China's "self-strengthening" movement. In almost every respect, Japan's strengths during the conflict were China's
MILITARY EDUCATION IN CHINA, 1842-1895
25
basis for progress reports to the throne.58 In 1890, a specialized program of instruction in railroad engineering was introduced, although no information exists on the total number of students involved 59
Periodically, students from the Tientsin Military Academy were sent to Port Arthur and Shan-hai-kuan for practical training in infantry, cavalry and artillery units.60 In addition, cadets at the school occasionally gained actual battle experience, notably in 1891 against rebel forces at Jehol and elsewhere. According to Li Hung- chang, the experiment was quite successful.61 Only one group of Tientsin academy cadets went abroad: In 1889, Li sent Tuan Ch'i- jui, Wu Ting-yüan, Shang Te-ch’üan, Kung Ch'ing-t’ang, and T’eng Yü-tsao to Germany for advanced study. After a year of military academy instruction in Berlin combined with advanced training at the Krupp gunworks in Essen, the students returned to China.62
Like the Tientsin Naval Academy, established by Li in 1880, the Tientsin Military Academy was financed by the shrinking Pei-yang maritime defense account.63 In all, the money was reasonably well- spent, but, as Wang Chia-chien has indicated, the academy suffered from a variety of administrative, financial, and other problems (in- cluding difficulties with foreign employees) many of which also plagued the few other military and naval training facilities of the period.64
Nonetheless, on the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, China ap- peared to have built a respectable military and naval organization. In fact, when conflict between China and Japan seemed likely, most Westerners gave the strategic edge to China.65 But the illusion of of China's superiority on land and sea was quickly shattered by Japan's rapid drive into Korea, Manchuria and China Proper. Judiciously combining land and sea operations, the Japanese com- pletely overwhelmed the diverse Chinese military forces sent to resist them.66 Throughout the war, reports from British, French, and other foreign observers repeatedly praised the Japanese for their able strategy and tactics, effective training, tight discipline, valor, espirit de corps, and the excellence of their support facilities. No. such praise was forthcoming for China.67
The Sino-Japanese War illustrated with striking clarity the bankruptcy of China's "self-strengthening" movement. In almost every respect, Japan's strengths during the conflict were China's
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