VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN CHINA, 1933
121
The new civil code, while it gives no such specific order for succession, does not vary greatly from the traditional system. The Chia-chang is supposed to be elected from among the body of relatives living in the common household. But if there is no such election, the position "shall fall upon the person who is highest in rank (of relationship) or where ranks are equal, on the person who is senior in age." Except in providing for an election there is nothing new here.
The Chia-chang is the general manager of the family. His authority is of several sorts: administrative and financial, moral, ethical and religious. In the first field his responsibilities cover funds brought in by all members of the group, for it is a distinctive feature of familism in China that incomes are pooled and expenditures made with reference to the needs of the entire family. Lands and properties are owned in his name, but this is only a matter of legal convenience. The property belongs to the family as long as the group holds together, and the Chia-chang's possession is merely a stewardship. He has received the property from his forefathers, and after his death it will remain with the family under a succession of managers.
In the disciplinary field the Chia-chang enjoys great powers, both by law and by custom, over the members of his direct family.2 This seems to have extended, in practice, to the right of taking the life of a disobedient child.3 At least in some circumstances such a crime would pass unpunished. Certainly in the fields of correction and discipline the law accords him great authority, as does customary practice. The new civil code of the Republic attempts to decrease the disciplinary authority of parents over their children, but does so only negatively by referring only to the "right and duty of parents to protect, educate and maintain their children.”4
1 China. National Government; op. cit., p. 43, art. 1124.
2 On the legal aspects see Alabaster; op. cit., p. 153-158, 186, 243-244. It should be noted that the rights of a husband over his wife are by no means as great as those over his children. Ibid., p. 186-189.
3 Su disputes the legality of this, and quotes sources from law as proof. Op. cit., p. 77. On the other hand, for circumstances in which it seems to be allowed, see Staunton; op. cit., (Ta Ch'ing Li Li, Sixth Division, Book III, sec. 319.) p. 348-349; Alabaster; op. cit., p. 155-157.
4 China. National Government; op. cit., p. 27-32, articles 1059-1090. Specifically, p. 31, art. 1084.
VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN CHINA, 1933
121
The new civil code, while it gives no such specific order for succession, does not vary greatly from the traditional system. The Chia-chung is supposed to be elected from among the body of re- latives living in the common household. But if there is no such election, the position "shall fall upon the person who is highest in rank (of relationship) or where ranks are equal, on the person who is senior in age." Except in providing for an election there is no- thing new here.
The Chia-chang is the general manager of the family. His au- thority is of several sorts: administrative and financial, moral, ethical and religious. In the first field his responsibilities cover funds brought in by all members of the group, for it is a distinctive feature of familism in China that incomes are pooled and expendi- tures made with reference to the needs of the entire family. Lands and properties are owned in his name, but this is only a matter of legal convenience. The property belongs to the family as long as the group holds together, and the Chia-chang's possession is merely a stewardship. He has received the property from his forefathers, and after his death it will remain with the family under a succession of managers.
In the disciplinary field the Chia-chang enjoys great powers, both by law and by custom, over the members of his direct family.2 This seems to have extended, in practice, to the right of taking the life of a disobedient child.3 At least in some circumstances such a crime would pass unpunished. Certainly in the fields of correction and discipline the law accords him great authority, as does custom- ary practice. The new civil code of the Republic attempts to decrease the disciplinary authority of parents over their children, but does so only negatively by referring only to the "right and duty of parents to protect, educate and maintain their children.”4
1 China. National Government; op. cit., p. 43, art. 1124.
2 On the legal aspects see Alabaster; op. cit., p. 153-158, 186, 243-244. It should be noted that the rights of a husband over his wife are by no means as great as those over his children. Ibid., p. 186-189.
3 Su disputes the legality of this, and quotes sources from law as proof. Op. cit., p. 77. On the other hand, for circumstances in which it seems to be allowed, see Staunton; op. cit., (Ta Ch'ing Li Li, Sixth Division, Book III, sec. 319.) p. 348-349; Alabaster; op. cit., p. 155-157.
4 China. National Government; op. cit., p. 27-32, articles 1059-1090. Specifically, p. 31, art. 1084.
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