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43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), 57-58, 70-71, 140-144, 273-277, and Ono's Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922), 120-126; also Oshima, 372-375, 376, note 18.
44 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 219-220; Yamagata, "The Army,” 107-108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, "Some Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;" Rawlinson, 190.
45 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 219, 221; see also Rawlinson, 202-203; Thomas William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 164-189, 204-215.
46 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 218-219; Cavendish, 721.
47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719-723.
48 Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions," 157, note 135.
49 See Fairbank, et. al., “Economic Change," 20-21; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 527-534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult Ernest Young, "Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 535.
50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, "The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, 1968).
51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4, 148-149.
52 See Kublin.
53 Smith, "Foreign-Training:" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245-246, 262. An interesting question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological weapon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all.
54 Dwight Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History (1967), esp. 486, 492.
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43 See Ono Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York, 1922), 57-58, 70-71, 140-144, 273-277, and Ono's Expenditures of the Sino-Japanese War (New York, 1922), 120-126; also Oshima, 372 - 375, 376, note 18.
44 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 219-220; Yamagata, "The Army,” 107- 108; British Public Record Office, W.O. 33/34, Captain Trotter, "Some Remarks on the Army of Li Hung-Chang;" Rawlinson, 190.
45 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 219, 221; see also Rawlinson, 202 - 203; Thomas William Ayers, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 164-189, 204-215.
46 Smith, "Foreign-Training," 218-219; Cavendish, 721.
47 Cavendish, 711, 713-715, 719 - 723.
48 Smith, "Chinese Military Institutions," 157, note 135.
49 See Fairbank, et. al., “Economic Change," 20-21; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 527-534. On the more positive side of the ledger, consult Ernest Young, "Nationalism, Reform and Republican Revolution: East Asia: Essays in Interpretation, 160-162; Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 535.
50 See, for example, Hatano Yoshihiro, "The New Armies,” in Mary Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913 (New Haven and London, 1968).
51 Paul Cohen, Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), 4, 148 - 149.
52 See Kublin.
53 Smith, "Foreign-Training:" Ralph Powell, The Rise of Chinese Mill- tary Power, 1895-1912 (Princeton, 1955), 245-246, 262. An interesting question is whether the Manchus could have preserved their power, and even enhanced it, by undertaking meaningful military reform at the central government level. Although vested interests in the army were pervasive and solidly entrenched, one cannot assume that what happened to the dynasty in 1911 would necessarily have happened in the same way had the Ch'ing government initiated reforms in the 1860's and 1870's comparable to those undertaken by the dynasty in the early 1890's. By the beginning of the twentieth century, anti-Manchu sentiment was a powerful ideological wea- pon, at least in part because the Manchus had proven so totally incapable of protecting Chinese interests against foreign encroachments. But during the Tung-chih period, anti-Manchuism was no real issue at all.
54 Dwight Perkins, "Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization : The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of Economic History (1967), esp. 486, 492.
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