EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT
Concluding Remarks
131
It is difficult to know to what extent the vision and vocabulary of the Chinese world order affected the perceptions and policies of Chinese officials in the late Ch'ing period. Obviously, the compelling rhetoric of the Chinese world order lasted longer than the Sinocentric system it described. This is quite understandable, for one could hardly expect the Ch'ing emperor to willingly abandon his claim to rule "all under Heaven" (t'ien-hsia). At the same time, it is clear that among the few informed "Confucian patriots" who had extensive contact with foreigners in treaty port areas, a new world view was rapidly evolving. Not surprisingly, this is clearer in their private writings and conversations than in their official communications and pronouncements.
My point, in any case, is not that "traditional" attitudes were breaking down faster than the official record would seem to indicate—although this was certainly true and deserves further study. Rather, I am suggesting that certain aspects of Chinese tradition were not, as is commonly supposed, necessarily inimical to modernization. Although the lingering perception of a hierarchical, Sinocentric world order unquestionably retarded China's modern development in some areas—notably her entrance into the so-called "family of nations"—this was less true in military affairs, where China's long tradition of borrowing foreign military talent was more of an asset than a liability. Recourse to foreign military assistance did not, after all, imply the inferiority of China's inherited culture, with its predominantly civil ethos, nor was it an affront to the dignity of the Chinese state (t'i-chih).
China's failure to use foreign military assistance effectively in the late nineteenth century was less a function of traditional attitudes toward the employment of barbarians, than of late Ch'ing administrative practice. Stripped of its world order rhetoric, much of Chinese policy toward the use of foreigners in late Ch'ing times seems to compare favorably with that of other nations in similar periods. A glance at Civil War America, for example, indicates that China was not alone in her concern over the linguistic and cultural integration of foreign officers, their fidelity, or the potential for interference on the part of their respective governments. Like the Chinese, both the Confederacy and the Union liberally rewarded foreign service, yet significantly, both also tended to reserve the highest ranks and greatest honors to individuals who
EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN MILITARY TALENT
Concluding Remarks
131
It is difficult to know to what extent the vision and vocabulary of the Chinese world order affected the perceptions and policies of Chinese officials in the late Ch'ing period. Obviously, the com- pelling rhetoric of the Chinese world order lasted longer than the Sinocentric system it described. This is quite understandable, for one could hardly expect the Ch'ing emperor to willingly abandon his claim to rule "all under Heaven" (l'ien-hsia). At the same time, it is clear that among the few informed "Confucian patriots" who had extensive contact with foreigners in treaty port areas, a new world view was rapidly evolving." Not surprisingly, this is clearer in their private writings and conversations than in their official communications and pronouncements,
My point, in any case, is not that “traditional" attitudes were breaking down faster than the official record would seem to indicate -although this was certainly true and deserves further study. Rather, I am suggesting that certain aspects of Chinese tradition were not, as is commonly supposed, necessarily inimical to moder- nization. Although the lingering perception of a hierarchical, Sinocentric world order unquestionably retarded China's modern development in some areas-notably her entrance into the so-called "family of nations" this was less true in military affairs, where China's long tradition of borrowing foreign military talent was more of an asset than a liability. Recourse to foreign military assistance did not, after all, imply the inferiority of China's inherited culture, with its predominantly civil ethos, nor was it an affront to the dignity of the Chinese state (t'i-chih),92
China's failure to use foreign military assistance effectively in the late nineteenth century was less a function of traditional attitudes toward the employment of barbarians, than of late Ch'ing adminis- trative practice. Stripped of its world order rhetoric, much of Chinese policy toward the use of foreigners in late Ch'ing times seems to compare favorably with that of other nations in similar periods. A glance at Civil War America, for example, indicates that China was not alone in her concern over the linguistic and cultural integration of foreign officers, their fidelity, or the poten- tial for interference on the part of their respective governments. Like the Chinese, both the Confederacy and the Union liberally rewarded foreign service, yet significantly, both also tended to reserve the highest ranks and greatest honors to individuals who
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