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RICHARD J. SMITH
deterioration of prospects in their homeland. Many foreign military men in the Chinese service came from aristocratic families, some as hostages. At times barbarians came to China as temporary allies, returning home after a limited tour of duty." Although the general tendency was to measure barbarian devotion by the yardstick of cultural submission, Chinese policymakers recognized that personal, bureaucratic and economic pressures necessarily complemented cultural controls. If an individual did not wholly accept the constraints of Chinese culture and the Confucian value system, he might still be ensnared by having a material stake in Chinese affairs or at least bound by personal relations and institutional limitations.
Economic inducements were particularly important, given the common stereotype of foreigners as "animal-like" and avaricious.18 In the eyes of many, barbarians could never possess what Ch'en Yen described as a “Chinese heart” (Hua-hsin). As the Han thinker Tung Chung-shu put it: "People like the Hsiung-nu cannot be converted by humanity and justice, but can only be appeased with huge profit, and tied down by an appeal to Heaven."19 Chia I, another Han scholar, developed the strategy of the "three standards and five baits” (san-piao wu-erh), designed to spoil the senses and win the hearts of barbarians through flattery, personal attention, imperial favor and material attractions.20 Yet another policymaker, the Ming statesman Chang Chü-cheng, sought to combine the carrot and the stick. In response to the question, "How can one hold responsible the arrogant, bellicose barbarians who have surrendered only recently?" Chang answered: Treat the foreigners like dogs, throwing them bones when they wag their tails and whipping them when they bark.21
Multiple restraints were deemed essential to the effective management of foreign military employees, for military affairs remained a closely guarded sphere of imperial control. The use of aliens in a civil capacity involved comparatively few risks. Outsiders with administrative ability were often genuinely attracted by the refinements of Chinese culture and, in any case, were checked by the usual limitations of civil bureaucratic power. But foreign military men, more likely to be unlettered and unimbued with civil virtues, were less susceptible to cultural and bureaucratic restraints. Since such individuals might command or control large numbers of troops, it was of special concern to the Chinese that their loyalty be both
116
RICHARD J. SMITH
deterioration of prospects in their homeland. Many foreign military men in the Chinese service came from aristocratic families, some as hostages. At times barbarians came to China as temporary allies, returning home after a limited tour of duty." Although the general tendency was to measure barbarian devotion by the yard. stick of cultural submission, Chinese policymakers recognized that personal, bureaucratic and economic pressures necessarily comple- mented cultural controls. If an individual did not wholly accept the constraints of Chinese culture and the Confucian value system, he might still be ensnared by having a material stake in Chinese affairs or at least bound by personal relations and institutional limitations.
Economic inducements were particularly important, given the common stereotype of foreigners as "animal-like" and avaricious.18 In the eyes of many, barbarians could never possess what Ch'en Yen described as a “Chinese heart” (Hua-hsin). As the Han thinker Tung Chung-shu put it: "People like the Hsiung-nu cannot be converted by humanity and justice, but can only be appeased with huge profit, and tied down by an appeal to Heaven."19 Chia I, another Han scholar, developed the strategy of the "three standards and five baits” (san-piao wu-erh), designed to spoil the senses and and win the hearts of barbarians through flattery, personal attention, imperial favor and material attractions,20 Yet another policymaker, the Ming statesman Chang Chü-cheng, sought to combine the carrot and the stick. In response to the question, "How can one hold responsible the arrogant, bellicose barbarians who have surrendered only recently?" Chang answered: Treat the foreigners like dogs, throwing them bones when they wag their tails and whipping them when they bark.21
Multiple restraints were deemed essential to the effective manage- ment of foreign military employees, for military affairs remained a closely guarded sphere of imperial control. The use of aliens in a civil capacity involved comparatively few risks. Outsiders with administrative ability were often genuinely attracted by the refine- ments of Chinese culture and, in any case, were checked by the usual limitations of civil bureaucratic power. But foreign military men, more likely to be unlettered and unimbued with civil virtues, were less susceptible to cultural and bureaucratic restraints. Since such individuals might command or control large numbers of troops. it was of special concern to the Chinese that their loyalty be both
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