26
STEPHEN UHALLEY, JR.
By this time, reads Elgin's record, "the other vessels of the squadron were within range of the nearest forts, which opened upon them with all the vigor with which they were capable.” The English ships then "steamed slowly by returning with considerable effect the fire directed against them.”6
Of course, this account may explain more than was intended by Elgin. If the other vessels were so quickly in position to be able to return fire, then the Taiping response to this approach by the British vessels is understandable, for they apparently thought they were being attacked in force. The formation must have appeared provocative to the Taipings. The white flag, of course, had no significance for them, except as the ensign of one of the Manchu banners. Not mentioned in the Elgin account is the fact that a large Imperialist fleet lay in the immediate vicinity.7 In fact, the river at this particular place was completely in the hands of the Imperialist fleet, so that the Taipings were prepared for trouble only from that direction. Since no effort had been made by the British to communicate with the Taipings earlier, and since it had been so long (four and a half years) since British naval vessels had paid a call at Nanking, the confusion among Taiping gunners was understandable. In order to emphasize the lesson, however, the British squadron anchored for the night a short distance away, and before proceeding on their upriver course the following morning, they redescended the stream to Nanking and again bombarded the forts for about an hour and a half. The Taipings “hardly ventured a reply,” or as one of the participating Englishmen commented, "they seemed determined not to show us any sport." Given this lack of response from the Taipings, Captain Barker, the chief naval officer, appears to have exceeded his authority. Elgin had given him a carte blanche on the course to be pursued, which was to "knock the forts about the ears of the Taepings," but this was to be contingent upon their showing "any more stomach for fighting." It seems that another consideration intervened. The British found an opportunity for, as the record reads: "leaving our mark, and exercising our men at the best of targets for it so happened that quarterly gunnery-returns would be soon required" so that "we gave our men a short practice at one or two of the forts." Incidentally, this report testified to the advantage taken of the British assault by the Imperialists who took the occasion to press an offensive of their own.10
26
STEPHEN UHALLEY, JR.
By this time, reads Elgin's record, "the other vessels of the squadron were within range of the nearest forts, which opened upon them with all the vigor with which they were capable.” The English ships then "steamed slowly by returning with con- siderable effect the fire directed against them.”6
Of course, this account may explain more than was intended by Elgin. If the other vessels were so quickly in position to be able to return fire, then the Taiping response to this approach by the British vessels is understandable, for they apparently thought they were being attacked in force. The formation must have appeared provocative to the Taipings. The white flag, of course, had no significance for them, except as the ensign of one of the Manchu banners. Not mentioned in the Elgin account is the fact that a large Imperialist fleet lay in the immediate vicinity.7 In fact, the river at this particular place was completely in the hands of the Imperialist fleet, so that the Taipings were prepared for trouble only from that direction. Since no effort had been made by the British to communicate with the Taipings earlier, and since it had been so long (four and a half years) since British naval vessels had paid a call at Nanking, the confusion among Taiping gunners was understandable. In order to emphasize the lesson, however, the British squadron anchored for the night a short distance away, and before proceeding on their upriver course the following morning, they redescended the stream to Nanking and again bombarded the forts for about an hour and a half. The Taipings “hardly ventured a reply," or as one of the participating Englishmen commented, "they seemed determined not to show us any sport." Given this lack of response from the Taipings, Captain Barker, the chief naval officer, appears to have exceeded his authority. Elgin had given him a carte blanche on the course to be pursued, which was to "knock the forts about the ears of the Taepings," but this was to be contingent upon their showing "any more stomach for fighting." It seems that another considera- tion intervened. The British found an opportunity for, as the record reads: "leaving our mark, and exercising our men at the best of targets for it so happened that quarterly gunnery-returns would be soon required" so that "we gave our men a short practice at one or two of the forts." Incidentally, this report testified to the advantage taken of the British assault by the Imperialists who took the occasion to press an offensive of their own.10
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