BRITAIN AND CHINA
117
not altogether the fault of the author, who has written the book as part of a series on Britain in the world today—though it detracts slightly from its value, does not in practice make it any the less interesting.
The question of recognition of the Communist government by Britain is very ably dealt with; the whole trend of opinion at the time, both in Britain and in the rest of the world is summed up. In 1949 Britain's commerce with China still far exceeded that of any other western country, and since the division into blocs was less rigid then than now, (though Britain consulted both the U.S. and the major Commonwealth countries) recognition was still a matter for each country to decide for itself. Happily the British government waited only three months to take this step; had it delayed another six, it would never have been taken, for the Korean war broke out. At the time international comment, even from the United States, was fairly favourable. It was realised that Britain had followed her usual pragmatic policy of recognition where a government was clearly in control as opposed to the U.S. ideological path of recognising only where it approved. Commercial groups and other British residents in China were influential in bringing this about; strangely enough, looking back over the last thirteen years, this was because the Communists appeared more honest and efficient than the KMT, and it was hoped that after recognition British interests would be able to expand.
Mr. Luard shows how quickly this hope became vain. For with the Korean war the new China entered on to the world stage with a vengeance, and came face to face with the United States.
In this conflict the British government always seems to have been slightly more aware of possible Chinese sentiments than the U.S., and to have hesitated rather more than the U.S. at the 38th parallel; and when President Truman began to talk of extending the war to Manchuria and of using the atom bomb, Mr. Attlee at once flew to Washington to make certain that U.N. forces were not to be committed to any extension of the fray without consultation with the other powers involved. Mr. Luard relates this episode in a particularly effective deadpan style which contrasts vividly with the drama of the events.
This British intervention epitomises the new role that Britain has since played in the world; she has been a mediator between
BRITAIN AND CHINA
117
not altogether the fault of the author, who has written the book as part of a series on Britain in the world today-though it detracts slightly from its value, does not in practice make it any the less interesting.
The question of recognition of the Communist government by Britain is very ably dealt with; the whole trend of opinion at the time, both in Britain and in the rest of the world is summed up. In 1949 Britain's commerce with China still far exceeded that of any other western country, and since the division into blocs was less rigid then than now, (though Britain consulted both the U.S. and the major Commonwealth countries) recognition was still a matter for each country to decide for itself. Happily the British government waited only three months to take this step; had it delayed another six, it would never have been taken, for the Korean war broke out. At the time international com- ment, even from the United States, was fairly favourable. It was realised that Britain had followed her usual pragmatic policy of recognition where a government was clearly in control as opposed to the U.S. ideological path of recognising only where it approved. Commercial groups and other British residents in China were influential in bringing this about; strangely enough, looking back over the last thirteen years, this was because the Communists appeared more honest and efficient than the KMT, and it was hoped that after recognition British interests would be able to expand.
Mr. Luard shows how quickly this hope became vain. For with the Korean war the new China entered on to the world stage with a vengeance, and came face to face with the United States.
In this conflict the British government always seems to have been slightly more aware of possible Chinese sentiments than the U.S., and to have hesitated rather more than the U.S. at the 38th parallel; and when President Truman began to talk of extending the war to Manchuria and of using the atom bomb, Mr. Attlee at once flew to Washington to make certain that U.N. forces were not to be committed to any extension of the fray without consultation with the other powers involved. Mr. Luard relates this episode in a particularly effective deadpan style which contrasts vividly with the drama of the events.
This British intervention epitomises the new role that Britain has since played in the world; she has been a mediator between
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