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3. Section 3 of this Ordinance inserts a new section 3A in the principal Ordinance. This new section takes one defence away from the defendant to any charge under section 3 of the principal Ordinance, as it provides that it shall be no defence to any charge under that section that the woman and girl in question consented to the transaction or received any part of the consideration.

4. It has been suggested that a possible defence to a charge of harbouring under section 18 of Ordinance No. 4 of 1897 would be that the accused was the person who had taken the girl out of the possession of the person having the lawful care of her, and that harbouring and taking are mutually exclusive. It is not to be supposed that the accused would expressly admit the suggested fact, but it would be argued that the evidence for the prosecution would naturally lead to that conclusion. On the other hand, it is just possible that the evidence of the prosecution would not be sufficient to discharge the onus of proof of a charge of taking under section 26 of the Ordinance, because under that section practically the whole onus is on the prosecution, whereas under section 18 a consider- able onus is thrown on the defendant. Accordingly, section 4 of this Ordinance amends section 18 of the principal Ordinance so as to make it clear that the person who abducts or imports may be convicted of harbouring. The opportunity is taken of expanding the word harbour into harbour, detain or have under control ".

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5. Section 32 of the Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance, 1897, Ordinance No. 4 of 1897, had a curious history in the five Women and Girls Ordi- nances enacted between 1889, the year in which the section first occurred, and 1897, and in its present form it is not quite satisfactory, especially in view of the provisions of the Female Domestic Service Ordi- nance, 1923, Ordinance No. 1 of 1923. Section 5 of this Ordinance proposes to substitute a new form of the section.

6. In the first place, the present section negatives in undesirably wide terms the right of a parent to the custody of a girl where the parent has parted with the girl for the purpose of adoption into another family, or has received money for parting with the custody of the girl for any purpose. The proposed new sec- tion 32 does not expressly negative any right on the part of the parent, but merely vests the guardianship of the girl in such a case in the Secretary for Chinese Affairs. It empowers the Secretary for Chinese Affairs as legal guardian to make any order regarding the custody of the girl which he may think desirable in her interests, subject to one qualification which is referred to below. In making any such order the Secretary for Chinese Affairs would no doubt give full weight to the natural and moral claim of the parent to the custody of the girl. Thus, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs will still have the full rights of a legal guardian, but there will be no provision to suggest that the natural claims of the parent have been extinguished. Further, there will be nothing to suggest that the parent could not successfully assert a claim as against a third party to the custody of the girl if the Secretary for Chinese Affairs were not to exercise his legal right of guardianship.

7. In the second place, the present section appears to give the Secretary for Chinese Affairs the full and unfettered right of a legal guardian. Section 10 of Ordinance No. 1 of 1923, however, considerably limits