TNAG-2981-FCO40-1473-Guangdong-nuclear-power-station-project-1982 — Page 255

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES OF MEETING TO DISCUSS GUANGDONG NUCLEAR PROJECT HELD AT ASHDOWN HOUSE ON 5 JANUARY 1982

Present:

HICK 166/1

Mr AJ Havelock Mr A J Lippitt

Mr RJ Davidson

Mr J Cameron

Mr A Paul

Mr R Allen

Mr N R Brice

(Chairman)

GEC

GEC Turbine Generators Ltd

GEC TG

FED FCO CRE/Trade

K

Pas 12/1

This meeting was called by Mr Havelock to discuss the spate of telegrams

that had arrived since Mr Manzie's Strategy Group meeting held on

23 December 1981, at which it was decided to concentrate upon the visit

to the UK of Cheng Gang, and therefore to put aside the suggestion by Lu Ying of some form of Anglo/US mission to Canton.

Mr Havelock very briefly outlined the contents of telegrams we had

received, namely that Lu Ying was pushing far more strongly for a

delegation to visit Canton to explain how a joint UK/US package might

be assembled, and the various advice we had received on that suggestion.

Mr Havelock also mentioned that CLP was becoming a little suspicious

and concerned about HMG's motives. He said that he wished to consider

whether the conclusions reached by Mr Manzie's meeting were still valid

in view of the latest communications. Mr Lippitt said that he was not

prepared to lead a commercial mission as there was nothing further

he could usefully say to the Chinese; he had, so far as he was aware,

already made clear both his company's and HMG's attitudes so far as they

had been decided. Mr Havelock also indicated that he was not in favour

of a delegation going to Canton, for the time being for 3 reasons:

overtly to support the American package might cause difficulties with

and the French as they would undoubtly get to hear of it as the UK had not

ĥ done anything similar with them, the uncertainty over the Westinghouse/

NNC relationship meant that the UK was not yet ready to put forward a

meaningful US/UK package and third we could not send a mission of this

strength until the views of the Chinese, both at central and provincial

levels, were clarified and less divided. Mr Paul felt that we had had

a clear indication following the meeting between Gu Mu and Mr Rees and

since Gu Mu was more authorative, we should follow that lead.

Mr Lippitt pointed out the although we could not totally ignore Lu Ying, because of the possible repercussions upon Hong Kong/Guangdong relations, nevertheless Chinese officials were normally cautious until

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