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irresponsibly in not seeking to apply realistic controls on nuclear exports to a country whose own policy in this area is irresponsible. Non-nuclear weapon states will complain that we are giving the PRC preferential treatment because of her nuclear weapon status. Indian objections to the deal
will be given extra weight, Indian obstructionism at international meetings on nonproliferation issues will become still more pronounced and she will have a further argument to support her continued refusal to accept IAEA safeguards on some of her nuclear facilities. The sale will be used by the Soviet Union as a convenient stick with which to beat us.
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On the other hand, the proposed sale raises no issues of genuine nonproliferation concern. The deal would not conflict with our formal obligations under the NPT or with the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. China has already attained a nuclear weapons capability without our help. None of the equipment or materials to be supplied are capable of significantly enhancing that capability, even if it were economically sensible to divert them to military use. The development of contacts with the Chinese on nuclear matters will give us an opportunity of encouraging them to move closer to the international main streams. And if we refuse to supply this power station the French will certainly step in, so the Chinese will get the technology anyway.
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US Attitude. The proposed contract would be dependent on US government approval for the supply of US-designed nuclear equipment, even though the bulk of it would be manufactured outside the US. The US government have already indicated to Framatome that they would not seek to prevent the transfer of US technology which would be involved in any French or UK/ French deal. On 14 April, Mr Pakenham of the British Embassy in Washington wrote on instructions to Mr Marshall of the US State
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