the Commission proposed that quotas should be imposed
unilaterally. All member states with the exception of
Gooday, Netherlan
A
in the textile management committee and it was
carried.
Soon afterwards, Indonesia retaliated against UK
exports. It was made clear that British companies' bids
for government contracts would not be considered. Early in
1981 a settlement was reached on quotas much larger than
we had originally intended (though less than Indonesia
had demanded). The outcome represented a UK climb-down
but was tolerable since the increased quotas were still in
line with the upper end of the normal range (2-5 times
the trigger level) and considerably less than the volume of
actual imports of the products concerned from the US (which,
being considered as a "high cost' producer, is it gubject Lo
any restraint, as the Indonesians pointed out with soun
bitterness).
✔
5. Since the EC-Indonesia Textile Agreement is essentially
protectionist, the UK's dispute with Indonesia was as much
about trade discrimination by the UK against the Third
World as vice versa. By taking a more hawkish stand on
textiles than many of its EC partners, Britain put at risk
competitive exports valued at up to $700 m for tho naka of
some £5-7 m of unsophisticated goods (trousers, blouses s..Ã
shirts) in which Britain had little or no comparative alinn-
tame. The disagreement appears to have had no lashing
damage on political or economic relations; if anything
are better now than before. But there has been a
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