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he treaty of 1876 thus applies -even if between France and the European territory of Great Britain it is superseded by the European Extradition Convention which is not applicable to Hong Kong.
3. It is also said -quite paradoxically- that the request for extradition would not be regular in respect of the provisions of the treaty of 14th August 1876.
Entirely based on article 6 of such treaty, the point so made is irrelevant because of its very basis: one can indeed only apply article 16 of that treaty, whereby "[English text]".
By the very effect of the treaty, the Governor of Hong Kong had thus the requisite authority and represented the High Contracting Party within the meaning of the treaty.
But even with respect to the other provisions of the treaty, supposing them applicable, the request is regular: on the one hand, it cannot be seriously held, in view of the text and of the signature that it does not emanate from the British Government.
On the other hand, in respect of article 6 (supposing it applicable), the request should have been made by "the Ambassador or another diplomatic agent of Her Britannic Majesty".
The documents filed with the Court, bearing the seal of the Embassy, are signed by Mr. John Lacey, first Consulate Secretary, and therefore a diplomatic agent, perfectly in compliance with article 6 of the treaty should it be held applicable (see enclosed: letter of the Ambassador of Great Britain authenticating the signature of Mr. Lacey).
It is, furthermore, the rule that it be so proceeded.
Thus, all the reasons raised to prevent the examination of the request on its merits shall be set aside.
III. Most of the efforts of the defendants are thereafter aimed at showing that the decision to refuse to extradite would not be capable of contentious recourse.
The plaintiffs have already fully explained their position in this respect in their first pleadings and confirm entirely the terms thereof.
And the discussion started by the other parties is not relevant in this respect.
1. It has never been the purpose of the plaintiffs to challenge the fact that the Government can always refuse an extradition for reasons pertaining to the carrying out of its international relations, which no internal judge can examine.
But it is an entirely different question when the Administration chooses that the discussion should focus on strictly legal issues, trying to oppose the extradition for reasons (which are in this case made explicit, be it even by reason of courtesy but which still constitute reasons -unless one should assume that courtesy permits inaccuracies) of a strict legal nature.
This is the case when, as in the case at stake and before even examining the extradition with respect to the aspects thereof which deal with international relations, the Administration holds:
that two of the counts of indictment would not constitute criminal offences in French law:
and that the three others would have been the subject of a negative advice of the Chambre d'Accusation, which is a question relating to the French internal procedure of extradition.
In such a case, one raises against the requesting State an impossibility of a legal nature even before any reason pertaining to the internal relations which could make it impossible to accept its request.
The decision does not, therefore, involves at all the international relations.
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