TNAG-2937-FCO40-4212-Future-of-Hong-Kong-nationality-British-National-(Overseas)-1993 — Page 4

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000420 MDLIAN 8091

without the negative consequences described in para. 3 above. One way of avoiding them might be to delay bringing the subsection into force until immediately before 30 June 1997, and then to do so as a technical exercise only (i.e. make no attempt to notify individuals or withdraw BN (0) passports and leave no trace which might be available to the sarg). The attraction of this approach is that, even if the question of right of abode were to remain unresolved, it would have little practical effect. There would also be no question of non-compliance with JD 226.

8. In practice, however, section 2(2) could not be easily enforced. We would Lack the means to withdraw BN (0) passports from BNS beneficiaries before 30 June 1997 or thereafter, unless and until they applied voluntarily for a BC passport. An exercise to withdraw passports would undoubtedly attract Chinese attention and may also rekindle criticism from them. We that there could on 1 July 1997 be a substantial number of BNS beneficiaries still retaining BN (0) rather than BC passports. Unlees the current practice of renewing BN (0) rather than BC passports. Unless the current practice of renewing BN (0) passports is changes so that BNS beneficiaries are identified, these BN (0) passports will continue to be renewed upon expiry after 1997. The continued circulation of large numbers of such passports which given incorrect information about the citizenship status of their holders would be very unsatisfactory, although it could be argued that there should not be any practical drawback to this as those concerned would also have BC status.

9. An alternative, therefore, would be not to implement the subsection. This would avoid both the practical and political problems set out above. The Chinese have always maintained, irrespective of section 2(2), that the BNS is contrary to the JD, and have indicated that they would not recognise British citizenship obtained under the scheme. Whether or not section 2(2) is brought into force is unlikely to change their stance. There is also a view of the Chinese that the British Government will use section 2(2) to her advantage, i.e. to force BNS beneficiaries to switch to British nationality at a chosen time so as to cause instability in Hong Kong.

10. On the other hand, failure to implement would give the Chinese reasonable grounds to accuse us of knowingly breaching a JD commitment which we have ourselves acknowledged. This would create a dangerous precedent, which the Chinese might exploit to justify JD breaches of their own. Nor should HMG get itself into a position