TNAG-2916-FCO40-4191-International-support-from-European-countries-regarding-the--1993 — Page 31

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2 9 NOV 1993

OF 2417OOZ NOVEMBER 93

INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING, BONN

INDE,

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/OUR TELNOS 355 AND 356 (NOT TO BONN) AND PEKING TELNO 1497:

VISIT BY PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN TO PORTUGAL

1 WE ASKED MARQUES TEIXEIRA, THE HEAD OF THE ASIA AND OCEANIA

DIVISION, MFA, IF HE COULD CONFIRM THAT THE CHINESE PRESIDENT WOULD

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BE STOPPING OVER IN LISBON, AND, IF SO, WHAT HIS PROGRAMME WAS.

2.

TEIXEIRA SAID THAT THE VISIT WAS INDEED GOING AHEAD. THE PROGRAMME WAS CONFIDENTIAL. BUT HE COULD TELL US THAT THE HIGHLIGHTS WOULD BE A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SOARES, AN OFFICIAL DINNER GIVEN BY THE PRESIDENT AT QUELUZ PALACE (PORTUGAL'S OFFICIAL GUEST HOUSE FOR VISITING HEADS OF STATE AND OTHER VIPS) AND TALKS, POSSIBLY OVER LUNCH, HOSTED BY PRIME MINISTER-CAVACO SILVA.

3. JIANG ZEMIN WILL ARRIVE LATE ON SUNDAY 28 NOVEMBER, BE IN PORTUGAL FOR ABOUT 24 HOURS AND DEPART AFTER DINNER ON MONDAY 29 NOVEMBER.

4.

TEIXEIRA SAID THAT MACAO WAS THE PRINCIPLE REASON FOR PORTUGAL WANTING TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND HOST THIS VISIT THOUGH, OF COURSE, PORTUGAL HAD BILATERAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS AS WELL. HE PUT FORWARD TWO OTHER REASONS IN JUSTIFICATION OF THE VISIT GOING AHEAD. FIRST, THE PORTUGUESE HAD NOT EXTENDED AN OFFICIAL INVITATION TO JIANG ZEMIN AND SO IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT, (WE STRICTLY SPEAKING, THE EU GUIDELINES WERE NOT BEING BREACHED. SAID WE DOUBTED THIS WOULD WASH.) SECOND, THE PORTUGUESE NOTED VON WEIZSAECKER'S INVITATION TO JIANG ZEMIN TO VISIT GERMANY (PEKING TUR), IE OTHER MEMBER STATES WERE BREAKING RANKS.

5.

FOREIGN MINISTER DURAO BARROSO WAS THE GUEST OF HONOUR AT AN EC AMBASSADORS' LUNCH ON 23 NOVEMBER AND WAS INVITED TO COMMENT ON JIANG ZEMIN'S VISIT. HE SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS AND SAID 'WELL, YOU KNOW OUR PRESIDENT', IMPLYING THAT THE VISIT HAD BEEN ACCEPTED LARGELY AS THE RESULT OF THE PRESIDENT'S INDEPENDENT WISH AND THERE WAS LITTLE THE GOVERNMENT COULD DO ABOUT IT.

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