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6.
I said that we, as he knew, would be most
reluctant to contemplate an extension of UNTAC's mandate. It was not just a matter of expense. We did not see the point. It could well be that some residual UN presence would be needed. For example, some kind of UN aid office was likely to be necessary. But, as I had told Mr Owada last November, it seemed to me that the international community was simply not facing up to the security situation which could prevail in Cambodia after the election of a new government. That government might well face a Khmer Rouge military threat. It was even possible, as Prince Sihanouk had recently pointed out, that if FUNCIPEC won the election and formed the government, they would be in the curious position of having no troops but facing opposition from the SOC with their large armed forces as well as the Khmer Rouge. The question of how a new Cambodian government could organise the security of its territory had long been urgent but no-one was doing anything about it. I did not think Mr Goulding's remarks about Asian countries assuming some military role should be lightly dismissed. It was conceivable that they could be given a new UN mandate of some kind so that they could provide assistance at the request of the new Cambodian government. The important thing was that key countries should begin to address these issues. We were also giving thought to the end game and would be in touch with the Japanese as soon as possible.
John Lokas.
Sir John Coles
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