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8
The detailed and painstaking work of assessment should be carried out by the coastal State concerned Security Forces who will probably have access to further information to complete the picture and background of the attacks and those persons responsible.
9
It is important that, once the collection and collation stages have been completed, the product be distributed to all agencies that need to know. These agencies include the Governments of coastal States for onward passing, the Governments of flag States for passing through maritime Administrations to shipowners and to other interested Government departments.
10 While carrying cash may sometimes be necessary to meet operational needs and crew requirements and to overcome exchange control restrictions in some States, it acts as a magnet for attackers and they will intimidate the master or crew members until the locations have been revealed. Shipowners should consider ways of eliminating the need to carry large sums of cash on board ship.
11 All ships operating in waters where attacks occur should have an anti-attack plan. The anti-attack plan should be prepared having regard to the risks that may be faced, the crew members available, their capability and training, the ability to establish secure areas on board ship and the surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided.
12
If at all possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid bottle-necks. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor, rather than on ships underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow steaming or longer routeing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during which the ship will be at risk. Charterparty agreements should recognize that ships may need to delay arrival at ports where attacks occur, either when no berth is available for the ship, or offshore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period.
13 It cannot be emphasized enough that all possible access points to the ship and any key and secure areas on it must be secured or controlled in port, at anchor and when underway. Crews should be trained in the use of any additional surveillance or detection equipment installed on the ship. Prior to leaving port the ship should be thoroughly searched and all doors or access points secured or controlled. This is particularly important in the case of the bridge, engine room, steering space and other vulnerable areas.
14 When ships are in, or approaching, areas where attacks take place, bridge watches and look-outs should be doubled. Additional watches on the stern or covering radar "blind spots" should be considered. Companies should consider investing in low-light binoculars for bridge staff and look-outs. Radar should be constantly manned although it may be difficult to detect low profile fast moving craft on ships' radars. A yacht radar mounted on the stern may provide additional radar cover capable of detecting small craft approaching from astern when the ship is underway.
15 A suitable qualified Radio Operator should be on duty at all times when ships are in, or approaching, areas where attacks occur. This duty should not be performed by the master though, on occasions, this may be unavoidable.
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