TNAG-2897-FCO40-4171-Hong-Kong-piracy-in-the-South-China-Sea-1993 — Page 64

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32 Indonesian officials stated that the required underkeel clearance of 3.5 metres is not sufficient and should be increased. This statement was not supported by any argument or statistics showing groundings of deep-draught

vessels.

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The Group did not see any necessity for an increase in the underkeel clearance requirement although it was noted that deep draught vessels have touched bottom on occasions and it was seen that draught calculations,(taking into account allowance for squat) were critical to the safe navigation of deep-draught vessels.

34 As noted above, there are reportedly numerous unconfirmed wrecks and shoal patches in the Straits. The Group considered that it would be useful to resurvey some of the alleged spots as may be necessary to ensure the safe passage of deep-draught vessels.

35 Deep-draught vessels bound for Singapore from the west and requiring to cross the west bound lane of the TSS were seen to be at particular risk and subject to difficult and critical navigational manoeuvres.

36 There was some discussion within the Group regarding the advisability of deep-draught vessels bound for Singapore exhibiting destination signals to advise other traffic that the vessel would be altering course across the westbound lane. As deep-draught vessels are presently able to exhibit the signals required by Rule 28 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, and there is in place a local warning system to advise other traffic, and radio broadcasts are made to advise shipping of vessels constrained by their draught, the Group felt that further signals would not constructively aid the safe navigation of vessels in this situation.

37 Noting that, according to Singapore authorities, only 20% to 30% of through traffic in the Singapore Strait participated in the Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS), the Group was of the opinion that safety of navigation in the area would be enhanced if all ships were to participate in the VTIS. To this end, it was seen that an additional Rule 8(b) to IMO's relevant Rules (Assembly resolution A.375(X)) would be the most effective method of gaining compliance by transiting vessels. There are some associated problems with this recommendation and these are addressed in the section on VTS.

Pilot services

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In discussions with Singapore shipowners and operators the Group was informed that one VLCC operator takes on board a Singapore "Port Captain" as adviser for the passage through the Straits. The adviser boards the vessel about 30 miles north of One Fathom Bank and remains on board until arrival in Singapore. There have been reports from some VLCC masters who have participated in this scheme that this was not necessary, as the "advisers" did not have a more comprehensive knowledge of navigation than the master and additionally were not fully aware of the handling characteristics or limitations of the vessel.

39 Apart from the above, there is the possibility for ships to make private arrangements with Singapore-based master mariners, who are experienced in the area, to board the ship and advise the master during the transit of the Straits. Anecdotal evidence was offered regarding a VLCC arriving in Singapore with a local adviser on board who had been employed due to the ship's radar being out of service and charts uncorrected.

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