TNAG-2897-FCO40-4171-Hong-Kong-piracy-in-the-South-China-Sea-1993 — Page 53

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

- 31.

Standard message formats

27

The standard message formats given in Annex 7 should be used for all piracy alert reports. In all cases of suspected or actual pirate attack, IMO and IMB should invariably be informed so that a reliable set of statistics is compiled and action is taken, as appropriate.

Lighting

28 Ships should use the maximum lighting available consistent with safe navigation, having regard in particular to the provisions of Rule 20(b) of the 1972 Collision Regulations. Bow and overside lights should be left on if possible. Ships must not keep on deck lights when underway, as it may lead other ships to assume the ship is at anchor. Wide beam floods could illuminate the area astern of the ship. Signal projector lights can be used systematically to probe for suspect craft using the radar guidance if possible. So far as is practicable crew members on duty outside the ship's secure areas when in port or at anchor should avail themselves of shadow and avoid being silhouetted by deck lights as this may make them targets for seizure by approaching attackers.

29 It has been suggested that ships should travel blacked out except for mandatory navigation lights. This may prevent attackers establishing points of reference when approaching a ship. In addition, turning on the ship's lights as attackers approach could alert them that they have been seen, dazzle them and encourage them to desist. It is difficult, however, to maintain full blackout on a merchant ship. The effectiveness of this approach will ultimately depend in part on the level of moonlight, but primarily on the vigilance of the ship's crew. While suddenly turning on the ship's light may alarm or dazzle attackers, it could also place the crew at a disadvantage at a crucial point through temporary loss of their night vision. On balance, this approach cannot be recommended.

Secure areas

30 In accordance with the ship's anti-attack plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers' cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled at all times and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Consideration should be given to the installation of special access control systems to the ship's secure areas. Ports, scuttles and windows which could provide access to such secure areas should be securely closed and should have laminated glass, if possible. Deadlights should be shut and clipped tightly. The internal doors within secure areas which give immediate access to key areas such as the bridge, radio office, engine room and master's cabin, should be strengthened and have special access control systems and automatic alarms.

31 Securing doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident.

In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security, the safety requirements should be paramount. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled.

32 Owners may wish to consider providing closed-circuit television (CCTV) coverage and recording of the main access points to the ship's secure areas, the corridors approaching the entrances to key areas and the bridge.

W/9181e

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