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ARRIVALS. ASHTON SAID THAT EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT THE ONLY WAY TO STEM THE FLOW IN SUCH CASES WAS TO SEND THOSE ARRIVING QUICKLY BACK TO CHINA. WE HOPED THAT THE CHINESE COULD AGREE TO A PROGRAMME OF RETURNS, TO START IN THE WEEK BEGINNING.12 JULY.
5.
YANG OUTLINED THE STANDARD CHINESE POSITION ON ECVIIS. THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY BACK UNTIL THEIR IDENTITIES, AND THE ACCOUNTS THEY HAD GIVEN OF THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES IN CHINA, HAD BEEN CHECKED. EVEN THEN, THE CHINESE ATTITUDE WOULD DEPEND ON THE RESIDENCE STATUS WHICH THEY HAD ENJOYED BEFORE THEY LEFT CHINA. CHINA'S ESTABLISHED POLICY, WELL UNDERSTOOD BY THE UNHCR, WAS ONLY TO ACCEPT BACK THOSE TO WHOM FORMAL PERMISSION TO SETTLE HAD ALREADY BEEN GRANTED: FROM WHAT WE HAD TOLD HIM, THE RECENT ARRIVALS MAY NOT FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. YANG ALSO MADE SEVERAL CONFUSING REFERENCES TO CHINA'S UNWILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT BACK ANY VIETNAMESE MIGRANTS WHO HAD REACHED CHINA AFTER 1978. DESPITE OUR PROBING, HE WAS NOT ABLE TO EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR THIS CUT OFF DATE, OR WHETHER IT WAS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE GRANTING OF PERMISSION TO SETTLE.
6.
ASHTON SAID THAT, IN PAST CASES, THE CHINESE CHECKING PROCESS HAD PROVED TIME-CONSUMING. HE URGED THE CHINESE IN THIS CASE EITHER TO SPEED IT UP, OR TO AGREE TO ACCEPT AT LEAST SOME OF THE NEW ARRIVALS BEFORE ALL THE CHECKS HAD BEEN COMPLETED. UNLESS WE COULD BEGIN RETURNING THEM QUICKLY, THE FLOW MIGHT BECOME A FLOOD, AND WE WOULD FACE A NEW CRISIS. THE NEW ARRIVALS SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LIVING IN CHINA SINCE THE LATE SEVENTIES. IT WOULD BE HARD FOR PEOPLE IN HONG KONG TO UNDERSTAND THE BASIS FOR ANY CHINESE RELUCTANCE TO TAKE THEM BACK, EVEN IF THEIR RESIDENCE STATUS WAS NOT FORMALLY CORRECT. AS YANG WAS WELL AWARE, ECVIIS FELL INTO A SEPARATE CATEGORY FROM OTHER VIETNAMESE MIGRANTS: IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO RETURN THEM TO VIETNAM. YANG TOOK NOTE AND UNDERTOOK TO REVERT WITH A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE AS SOON AS HE COULD.
COMMENT 7.
YANG'S REMARKS ARE NOT ENCOURAGING. FURTHER PRESSURE MAY WELL BE NECESSARY TO PRODUCE QUICK CHINESE DECISIONS, AND THESE MAY NOT IN ANY CASE BE POSITIVE. WE RECOGNISE THAT THE CHINESE ARE IN PRACTICE UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO RETURNS BEGINNING AS EARLY AS THE COMING WEEK. BUT AS A NEXT STEP, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL IF PEKING COULD TAKE PARALLEL ACTION WITH THE MFA, TO REINFORCE OUR APPROACH TO NCNA. THIS MIGHT ALSO ELICIT A CLEARER STATEMENT OF CHINESE POLICY TOWARDS ECVIIS THAN YANG WAS ABLE TO GIVE US.
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