TNAG-2862-FCO40-4116-Article-XIX-(lobby-group-for-press-freedom)-and-Hong-Kong-Jo-1993 — Page 110

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

Urgent Business: Hong Kong, Freedom of Expression and 1997

the media - have also given little hope that rights such as freedom of expression will be observed after the handover. Many of the journalists who responded to a survey of the profession in 1991 were all too aware of the hostility with which China regards the Hong Kong media, a hostility greatly exacerbated by the sympathetic coverage given to the events in Beijing during the spring and summer of 1989. Senior Chinese officials were said to attach considerable blame to the Hong Kong media for fanning the protest in China and for galvanizing those in the territory itself.

Beijing's re-evaluation of its strategies after 1989 examined how broadly to re-establish its influence over the media, and how to salvage its badly tarnished image in the territory. This reportedly set out a classic united front strategy by which the Xinhua News Agency, Beijing's de facto embassy in Hong Kong, would seek to "isolate and attack" those in the media it saw as being irreversibly hostile to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, while using its influence variously to flatter, coerce or intimidate others to moderation or compliance. The subtle threat of recrimination or reprisal has led to an increase in self-censorship, according to journalists interviewed in a survey carried out by Hong Kong's Chinese University.

1.3 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

More recently it has been the impact of the current diplomatic breakdown over the political reform proposals put forward by Governor Pattern that has set the mood for the handover. Mr Patten's proposals widen the franchise for the coming 1995 Legislative Council elections, though without increasing the number of directly-elected seats to the legislature. By doing this, the Governor argued that he was using all the powers available to him to further democracy while remaining within the provisions of the Basic Law.

China's response has been unequivocal. It has refused to discuss any transitional issues of importance unless the proposals are dropped unconditionally. It has threatened to replace the political system that carries into 1997 with a separate system if the proposals are enacted into law. Indeed, China has made it absolutely clear that it will dismantle after 1997 any constitutional structures which it considers to be inconsistent with the Basic Law.

In a sense, the row has revealed China's true colours. That Beijing reacts in this way to proposals which only modestly alter the status quo, and certainly do not match up to the spirit of intended democracy in the Joint Declaration, is deeply concerning. It is clear now that its perception of the "one country, two systems" principle under the Joint Declaration is that in the strictly economic sphere there might be two systems, but politically there is only one. This conflict is about the degree of political autonomy Hong Kong will have after 1997; it is about China ensuring its authority cannot be challenged or "subverted". The implications for freedom of expression, and other rights, are very serious.

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