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on Sakhalin Island were fully alerted by 17:36 hours. The radar contact was established by Sakhalin based radars and the track was plotted from 17:45 hours and position 49°42'N, 148°38'E, altitude 9 000 metres and speed 800 km/h. The contact, again labelled track 6065, was identified thereafter on the Sakhalin operational plots by the annotation "91", which indicated one military aircraft. At 17:52 hours the steady track of the contact again raised doubts and the command centres recordings contained a question as to whether it could be a Soviet aircraft.
2.15.2
Two SU-15 fighter aircraft were scrambled from the airbase at Sokol: 805 at 17:42 hours and 121 at 17:54 hours; a MIG 23, 163, was scrambled from Smirnykh at 17:46 hours.
More interceptors were brought to readiness for immediate take-off at various airbases. There was concern with the early morning frontal weather which had resulted in more than one airfield, including Smirnykh, being below the operational weather minima.
2.15.3
At 17:53 hours an order was given to the ground control that the contact was a combat target, which was to be destroyed if it violated the State border. At 17:58 hours interceptor 805 was ordered to follow and identify the target which by that time was about to enter the Bay of Terpenie. At the same time conflicting instructions were given to 805 to hold a position suitable for an immediate attack. 805 and 163 were at altitude and following the contact from 18:00 and 18:08 hours, respectively. Controllers were ordered not to close the interceptors directly astern of the target because of the cannon carried in the tail. At 18:08 hours the pilot of 805 reported that he could see the target, at a distance of 4.5 to 5 km, but because of darkness he could not identify the aircraft type. It was suggested that if there were four contrails then it would be an RC-135. At 18:09 hours an order was given to the controller to destroy the target. However, the order was immediately changed to require him to wait until the State border had been violated, because concerns had been expressed about taking action over the high seas.
2.15.4
The plot of the tracks of the intruder, 6065, and two of the interceptors, 805 (track 0351) and 163 (track 0352) showed 805 consistently astern of and to the right of the intruder from 18:00 hours when 805 turned in behind; 163 was shown as following further behind and further to the right. This information on the relative position of 805 did not agree with the information from the communication transcripts and the recollections of the pilot of 805. The command centre transcripts suggested that 4.5 to 5 km was the closest that 805 came to the target, in various relative positions from slightly ahead through abeam to astern, but for most of the time during the interception the range was 8 to 12 km. Shortly after 18:12 hours the intruder was interrogated by 805 using the Soviet electronic identification system, but there was no response. At 18:15 hours limitations in radar coverage necessitated the handover of control of the interceptors from one ground control station to another. By 18:16 hours the intruder had re-entered USSR sovereign airspace and was about to cross the southern end of Sakhalin Island. An officer of the USSR Air Defence command mentioned at 18:17 hours that the unidentified aircraft might be a passenger aircraft. There was then confusion over whether the intruder aircraft displayed lights. Subsequently the task to destroy the aircraft was confirmed with the comment, "If there are no lights it cannot be a passenger (aircraft]." Based on the transcripts it was evident that command centre personnel were concerned with the position of the intruder aircraft in relation to USSR sovereign airspace as well as its identity.
2.15.5
The CVR record showed that between 17:54 and 18:15 hours the flight crew of KE 007 was engaged in casual conversation on the flight deck and in light-hearted exchanges with the flight crew
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