TNAG-2856-FCO40-4109-Hong-Kong-compensation-claim-regarding-Korean-Air-Lines-Flig-1993 — Page 120

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

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Equally, information regarding the movements of the RC-135 was given as derived from monitored USSR communications. To a question whether the movements of the RC-135 were available from its flight plan or mission report, the representatives of the United States responded that:

"The [United States] is not aware of any residual information on the movements of the RC-135 from the RC-135 itself or from other U.S. sources."

As KE 007 passed south of the orbiting RC-135 at about 16:00 hours, the question arose whether the RC-135 was monitoring the airspace around it and up to what range, or whether the RC-135 was covered by other ground- or air-based radar facilities. The representatives of the United States stated that:

2.14

2.14.1

"There was no radar coverage of the RC-135 while in orbit from [U.S.] ground, sea, or air facilities. The RC-135 used normal navigational equipment and on-board monitoring equipment to monitor airspace around it for protection only. No recorded data is available."

KE 007 over Kamchatka

The track plotted by the USSR showed that the aircraft steadied in a southwesterly direction at 16:23 hours, at 8 000 metres and flying at 800 km/h. Track 6065 was annotated "81" to indicate one unidentified aircraft. This track was plotted until 16:41 hours. However, contact had been lost at 16:37 hours and a curve to the south shown after that time was stated to have been the result of a forecast by the plotting team based upon previous experience of the actions of intruder aircraft. The observed behaviour of the aircraft on track 6065 and the pattern of radio transmissions on military frequencies by the orbiting RC-135 resembled those of previous intrusions. Therefore, USSR Air Defence command assumed that the aircraft was an RC-135. At least four interceptor aircraft were scrambled from airfields in Kamchatka. Plotted tracks of two of these interceptors were provided which showed them vectored east at about 16:41 hours to intercept the apparently southerly moving intruder. Radar contact with the intruder was re-established at 16:46 hours, approximately in position 54°12'N, 159°30'E and again labelled track 6065, one unidentified aircraft, at 9 000 metres and 800 km/h, tracking steadily southwest. The fighters were then vectored to the west to intercept the intruder. The fighters were unable to make an interception and at 17:06 hours were forced to return to base. Radar contact with the intruder was lost by radars on Kamchatka at 17:28 hours and the last position plotted was 51°12'N, 151°31'E. Records of the communications between the interceptors and ground control in Kamchatka were not available.

2.15

KE 007 over Sakhalin and activities at the Soviet command centres

2.15.1

The tapes and transcripts provided by the Russian Federation indicated that the Sakhalin command centre was aware of the intruder over Kamchatka before 17:20 hours. It was known that the airbase at Elizovo, Kamchatka, had sent up interceptors which were unable to establish contact with the intruder. At 17:23 hours a check on possible Soviet long-range traffic was instituted whilst two fighter aircraft were brought to immediate readiness. At 17:29 hours it was reported that there were no Soviet aircraft in the area. A few minutes earlier, at 17:27 hours, the commanding general in the Sakhalin area had been informed that there had been a border violation over Kamchatka and that an RC-135 was moving towards Sakhalin Island tracking on a heading of 240° over the Sea of Okhotsk at a range of 500 km. Identification as an RC-135 was still provisional at that time. The USSR Air Defence forces

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