06-AUG-1993 16:43
N
+ 852 868 4679
P.03
!
Like the US,
the
The
we are fully alive to consequences of not achieving success at this round. substantive differences between the two sides appear to be so narrOW that if we are unable to reach a deal now, the prospects for a resumption of talks in time to conclude a ASA before 1997 will look decidedly slim. separated Failure to conclude a deal will probably deprive the US carriers for all time of the enhanced benefits that are currently
offer on
from us,
to
of say nothing
the substantial rights that Bermuda 2 already provides, but that is a matter for their judgement.
Taking Gretch's key points seriatim:
(a) the ASA text: I enclose a paper setting out
the areas that we consider to be unresolved. Apart from the User Charges article, we do not foresee much difficulty there. perhaps you or the Americans could let me know if something has been missed.
(b)
But
Double designation at Chicago: as I have mentioned to you, we do not rule this out in principle, subject to the adequacy of safeguards and to the shape of the overall
deal.
(c) Cargo fifths: our understanding of the
position is set out below:
Bermuda 2:
US proposal:
Nil
up to 5 to each of two points in the region to be selected (i.e. a total of 10).
Hong Kong proposal: up to 7 to Thailand
In
(provided the existing pattern of combination services to Singapore is not switched to Thailand).
Hong Kong telno 682 of 4 May, we indicated that we would be prepared to discuss some additional flexibility. What the difference boils down to therefore, subject to agreement on the points that may be so served, is 3 fifths. The task of narrowing this could conceivably be simplified if the US were amenable to imposition of uplift/discharge points in this
restrictions.
Sensitive
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