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MDHIAN 5938
CASE,
IF
SHOULD REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, SETTING OUT THE FACTS OF THE BUT THIS COULD BE DONE DURING INFORMAL COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS. HOWEVER, TIME WAS PASSING, AND ACTION NEEDED TO BE TAKEN SOON. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL DID BECOME INVOLVED HE WOULD NEED TIME TO WORK, WHICH WOULD ALSO GIVE A CHANCE FOR FURTHER BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE NORTH KOREANS.
3.
VORONTSOV (RUSSIA) SPOKE IN SUPPORT. NOW THAT THE NORTH KOREANS SEEMED TO BE COOLING DOWN A LITTLE IT WAS TIME FOR THE COUNCIL TO INVITE THEM TO RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION THROUGH THE SORT OF MEASURED APPROACH SET OUT BY WALKER. I SAID THAT OUR POSITION WAS IDENTICAL TO THAT OF THE US. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR THE COUNCIL NOT TO TAKE UP THE MATTER, WHICH WOULD BE LIKE JAMMING THE SAFETY-VALVE ON A BOILING KETTLE. PUBLIC PRESSURE WOULD INCREASE FOR STRONGER ACTION. THE COUNCIL WAS NOW SEIZED OF THE MATTER AND SHOULD TAKE A POSITION, AS THE US HAD OUTLINED. A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT WOULD BE BOTH LOW-KEY, AND (BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR CONSENSUS) GIVE AN INDICATION OF COUNCIL UNANIMITY. WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A CONTINUING LACK OF COUNCIL ACTION. I ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL MIGHT PREFER TO TAKE ACTION WITHOUT AN EXPLICIT COUNCIL REMIT, IF HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD HELP HIS CONTACTS WITH THE DPRK (TUR PARA 5).
4.
MERIMEE (FRANCE) SPOKE IN SIMILAR TERMS. IT HAD TO BE MADE CLEAR THAT THE COUNCIL WAS NOW ACTIVELY DEALING WITH THE MATTER. IF BLIX REPORTED FORMALLY TO THE COUNCIL, A STATEMENT MIGHT NOT BE NEEDED, AS THE WORLD WOULD SEE THAT THE COUNCIL WAS CONSIDERING THE ISSUE. INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS HOWEVER WOULD REQUIRE SOME FORM OF PUBLIC CONCLUSION, POSSIBLY A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRESS.
5. CHEN (CHINA) SAID HE HAD RECEIVED NO NEW INSTRUCTIONS, BUT UNDERTOOK TO REPORT. HE RECALLED RECENT STATEMENTS BY HIS FOREIGN AND PRIME MINISTERS DECLARING THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT TAKE UP THE ISSUE. AS VORONTSOV HAD NOTED, THE TEMPERATURE WAS COOLING, BUT COUNCIL ACTION WOULD CAUSE A RE-ESCALATION. IAEA EFFORTS HAD SO FAR FAILED BECAUSE TOO MUCH PRESSURE HAD BEEN PUT ON THE DPRK. THE SAME MISTAKE SHOULD NOT BE REPEATED, AND THERE SHOULD BE FURTHER BILATERAL CONTACTS, INVOLVING CONCESSIONS FROM BOTH SIDES. HE ADDED THAT CHINA DID NOT FAVOUR THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, TO WHICH WALKER RESPONDED THAT THE BOUTROS-GHALI WAS ABLE TO TAKE SUCH ACTION, WHICH HE WAS KEEN TO DO, ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY. WALKER WAS HAPPY IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WANTED TO DO THIS WITHOUT A SPECIFIC COUNCIL MANDATE. NO ONE WANTED TO PUSH THE
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