TNAG-2825-FCO40-4076-Future-of-Hong-Kong-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-1993 — Page 11

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With Hong Kong vehicular traffic being what it is, it could take more than an hour to get any kind of trained negotiating response to support ATC and local staff. Clearly the airport would be a focal point for potential terrorist activity. Some negotiating response or 'first aid' training is necessary for locally based police staff to enable them to hold the situation and support civilian staff until the full negotiating team arrives.

The only concern I have of the command structure at the airport was that the OIC changed four times in an hour. It went from the District Commander to Dep Regional Commander to Regional Commander and finally to the Director of Operations. If the contingency plans indicate that the D of Ops will take charge, it may be that there should only be one change. There were too many senior people in the control room and too much of an opportunity for ambiguity of command. This situation pertained for only the first few hours of the exercise and eventually a clear line of command emerged. Once again there is a substantial cultural difference between our two Services and I can only make this comment from a UK based perspective.

The Port

The response at the port was very slow. At 1516 hrs the Operations Manager for Sealand first reported that his vessel had been hijacked and was expected to dock at 1800 hrs. He spoke directly to the marine police at 1536hrs. The first police arrived on the scene at 1625hrs. Even after arrival of police little support was provided to the Operations Manager. In fact, once again - as at the airport- the importance of this individual was not recognised until very late in the day. Had he not been a naturally competent individual who - once again for good logistic and safety reasons - had pre-warning of the exercise, serious problems could have occurred.

Instead of providing support for the Ops Manager, police seemed totally pre- occupied with the discipline of establishing an incident command centre and a forward command post, so much so that the incoming vessel and terrorists demands were all but forgotten. Containment around the dock area was only achieved five minutes before the ship docked despite 2.45 hrs notice.

Command and Control is vital, but the immediate priorities could have been handled from a police vehicle if necessary, leaving a senior officer free to support the Ops Manager. (The Ops Manager said at 1841 hrs, "Where are the negotiators, I don't want my crew to be killed").

I was unable to observe the post scenario for very long and I have no doubt it eventually settled down to a working level. I have to say that at 1900 hrs it had not done so.