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it in practice, while leaving the legal position as it is. questions had not previously been thought through.
9.
TWO
Firstly, would the Chinese agree to an administrative boundary but accept that, because of the legal position here before 1997, sometimes our security forces would be required to exercise jurisdiction beyond our side of the line? Plainly
they would not accept this: or at least they would explicitly demand the same rights for their forces, in which case the agreed boundary would be meaningless.
10.
Secondly, how would we answer questions (from LegCo or the public) on what the RHKP would do if a crime was committed on the far side of the agreed boundary but still within the area for which under the laws of Hong Kong they were responsible? or on what HKG's position would be if there were a civil dispute in the 'no man's land' between our legal and 'administrative' boundaries and over which the Hong Kong courts would have jurisdiction.
11.
Against this, the legislative option is higher profile and more politically charged than the lower key 'operational/ approach. Particularly if the current difficult relationship with China continues, putting an agreement into legislation
would draw LegCo (and Parliamentary) attention to the fact that we were ceding territory, legally as well as administratively.
12.
-
The Secretary for Security believes that it would not
be possible to sell the new boundary to LegCo solely on security grounds that is, to help prevent incursions. Success in selling the idea here (and in Westminster) would depend on the Chinese attitude. While they would certainly stick to their
formal position that the boundary of the SAR was a matter purely for China, they might in some form acknowledge that the line agreed by the two "local" authorities would be taken into
account.
13.
If we were unable to persuade Legco, at its worst we might risk a CFA-style fiasco, with LegCo rejecting the product
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3.
דיי
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