TNAG-2822-FCO40-4072-Hong-Kong-boundaries-and-territorial-waters-1993 — Page 12

CONFIDENTIAL

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MDHIAN 3681

politicised issue, with many in LegCo likely to object to formal ceding of territory.

5.

We do not think that it will be possible to sell a new legal

that is, to help boundary to LegCo solely on security grounds prevent incursions. If the Chinese were in some form to acknowledge that the Line agreed between Hong Kong and Guangdong would be taken into account in drawing up the boundary for the SAR, we would be on firmer ground. But we suspect that they will stick to their formal position that the SAR boundary is purely a matter for China. (Indeed, there is a risk that they would peact badly if we tried to implement the deal through legislation. They have repeatedly stressed that they see the negotiations with Guangdong as leading to an administrative boundary which would have no implications for sovereignty.)

6. If we were unable to persuade LegCo, we would risk a Court of Final Appeal-style row, with LegCo rejecting the product of our ''secret talks'' with the Chinese. We could also end up with an inconsistency between imperial Legislation and Hong Kong Legislation. While it is clear that the former would take precedence, this is something we would want to avoid.

7. Our preference therefore remains to implement any agreement through an MOU between Hong Kong and Guangdong, Leaving the Legal position unchanged. We accept that this route also has drawbacks, notably the gap which would emerge between the Legal and administrative boundaries. But, as we explained in TUR, that gap already exists to some extent at sea, where the Police do not patrol beyond certain limits in the bays or beyond the square box boundary.

But

8.

An MOU would of course not be binding on the Chinese. given the implications of a binding agreement for sovereignty, we do not see any prospect of them signing up to such an arrangement,

That said, we even if we were to Legislate for the new boundary. would as you suggest want to press in the JLG for the new boundary, once agreed to be adopted by the NPC as the HKSARG boundary. We believe that the chances of succeeding in this would be greater if the agreed boundary had been adopted in practice as an administrative boundary.

Conclusion

9. The Governor is inclined to defer a firm decision on the

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