Quite!
28/07 '93
09:29
0712708328
ifl.rb/Kalen/27.7
HMT INT. FINANCE →→→ ERD
008/007
5.
6.
The cons foreseen at the time were:
(i)
The Chinese might have suspected our motive to be "internationalisation" of Hong Kong as a buffer against
China.
(ii) There is some expense for Hong Kong in hosting the our motives or meetings: the Chinese might again suspect decide that the new Hong Kong authorities cannot afford to host such high profile meetings.
does If the situation in Hong Kong
deteriorate in (iii) the immediate run up to 1997, the holding of the meetings
could be put at risk.
attitudes have
far at (so
taken well to the
The worries about the Chinese least) proved unfounded. The Chinese have initiative, and have proved cooperative and very positive. They have raised some points about the format of the meetings, and the respective roles of the three governments involved, but these have been resolved satisfactorily and amicably.
7.
a role
The IMF and IBRD Executive Boards were formally informed on the 1997 1 October 1992 that Hong Kong was interested in hosting Annual Meetings, and that this idea was supported by the UK and travelled An informal Fund and Bank technical mission has China. to Hong Kong to assess the facilities, and found them adequate. They are indeed probably better than in almost any other city
city in Asia. Since the last Annual Meetings in September 1992 we have come to an agreement with the Chinese as to how prominent
The the Hong Kong authorities would take at the Annual Meetings.
agreed) Chinese have suggested (and Hong Kong have
that at the
opening session, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) will make a brief opening statement, and introduce the Governor for China. The HKSAR may also host a reception for official delegations, but it has been agreed that this would be following, and not overlapping with, the reception hosted by the Governor for China.
f
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.