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Peking. As a result we felt we should try to make the guidelines clearer and to ensure that they more accurately reflected the thinking behind our policy. Since then we and MOD (DESO) officials have been working on further amendments.
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The existing guidelines do not permit "the direct export of defence-related equipment, including parts and technology destined for the Taiwan armed forces if its acquisition would enhance their capability". The redraft,
The redraft, agreed with NPDD and MOD, would allow the export of equipment, and parts provided they are not of a "significant" nature. This is (deliberately) a vaguer formulation to take account of the fact that much equipment of a low-profile nature could probably be sold to the Taiwan military without attracting Chinese attention or protest.
5. Unfortunately the subject of arms sales guidelines generally is very sensitive at present. I understand that one of the central issues in the present enquiry into arms sales to Iraq is the claim that Parliament was misled, or not informed, about a change in publicly announced guidelines for Iraq. I also understand that, as a result of the Matrix Churchill case, an amendment to arms sales guidelines to Iran, which is being discussed by Ministers, is to be announced to Parliament. However, the case of Taiwan is different; the existing guidelines for Taiwan have not been made public, because of Chinese sensitivities on the matter. (The Chinese regard any arms sales to Taiwan as interference in their internal affairs). In the case of Iran there are no such third country sensitivities to take into account. But we do have a public Line to Take. follows that the amended guidelines would not have to be made public and we could interpret them "imaginatively", but the public line would probably require some modification. Even though the change would be slight, it would almost certainly be noticed and give rise to questions. Thus allegations of misleading or not informing Parliament could again arise.
It
6. We also need to consider carefully how the Chinese might react to a loosening of our guidelines should this become public. Following the recent sale to Taiwan of F16s by the US and Mirage 200-5s by France, the Chinese are even more jumpy than usual about arms sales to Taiwan. They have reacted to the Mirage sale by closing the French Consulate-General in Canton and (purportedly) excluding the French from the Canton metro project. Although British companies rightly see continuing and growing scope for defence sales to Taiwan, we cannot afford to damage further our relationship with China and add to the difficulties we face already over Hong Kong by drastically relaxing our policy.
less drastic relaxation might be manageable with China and would be very welcome to our firms.
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