¡
!
The Implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration
41
pages and 500,000 words records a wide range of Hong Kong's concerns from loss of nationality, fear for human rights, the Basic Law and its interpretation to the long-standing problem of the Vietnamese boat people. But underlying and exacerbating these various concerns was the belief that the Hong Kong government had not taken the initative in developing a more representative system of government as provided for in the Joint Declara- tion. Quite apart from the many individual submissions which complained of this procrastination, representatives of more than 20 professional and other bodies who gave oral or written evidence criticized the Hong Kong government for not fulfilling public expectations of political reform.
The report of the FAC's inquiry and its recommendations fully and fairly reflected Hong Kong's concems. These were germane to the question of whether the people of the territory would be granted the institutional capability to manage their own internal affairs, with a high degree of autonomy, as intended by Parliament, and as repeatedly promised by the Beijing government in the lead-up to the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1984. As Hong Kong's right to enjoy this capability has become the bone of contention in the current Sino-British deadlock over electoral arrangements for 1995, I make no apologies for quoting the relevant section of the FAC report in full:
Administration to 1997
3.4 It is most important that in the day-to-day administration of Hong Kong prior to 1997 the Hong Kong Government is seen to be governing Hong Kong in Bccordance with the wishes and interests of the Hong Kong people and not in response to the perceived wishes of the Beijing Government or even of the British Government. We were told that in the past there has sometimes been a perception that that seemed not to be the case. A particular example, and one which was frequently mentioned to us, was the 1987 review of the development of repre- sentative goverment which culminated in the 1988 White Paper. We do not believe that there is anything to be gained from a detailed re-examination of these events, but the mistrust of the Hong Kong Government which was caused among a significant proportion of Hong Kong people during that time persists and should not be underestimated.
3.5 During our evidence session on 12 June with Sir David Wilson we asked whether he still believed in "mirror-imaging" the arrangements established in Hong Kong before 1997 with what was expected to be provided in the Basic Law. In March, Sir David had told us that "mirror-imaging" had the objective of providing the continuity of the legislature through 1997 which demanded that "whatever is the percentage of direct elections laid down in the Basic Law (would be the percentage) in our final election under British administration.” We were disappointed that he still argued in June that, particularly with regard to developing
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.