TNAG-2769-FCO40-3986-Hong-Kong-and-the-media-interviews--press-briefings-and-the--1994 — Page 224

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FM PEKING

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 1295

OF 210844Z SEPTEMBER 93

INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG, UKREP JLG HONG KONG

HKB 301/1

2 SEP 1993

pa. Media (168)

065627 MDHIAN/5956

HONG KONG TELNO 1489 AND YOUR TELNO 828 TO HONG KONG: HONG KONG TALKS: PRESS BRIEFING

1.

Even though there is no evidence that the Chinese press Leaks are the result of a deliberate top-level decision to breach our agreement on confidentiality, I have no qualms about our now undertaking some briefing of our own, provided that we can do it in a way which effectively promotes our interests.

2. Against this criterion I strongly agree that whatever briefing is done in the run-up to Round 12 and (more important) to your meeting with Qian Qichen should be subtle and discreet: a spate of articles attributed to "British sources" or the Like would be damaging.

3. On the content of briefing, I agree (para 2 of second TUR) that we should avoid giving the impression that we are preparing for break-down. It is right to convey the impression that we are now uncertain about the Chinese approach, but a key message is that we ourselves are still doing all we can to achieve a successful outcome (ie an agreed outcome which will result in fair, open and acceptable elections - criteria to which the Chinese have previously said they have no objection and with the agreed basis for the talks).

4.

-

Most of the points in para 2 of Hong Kong TUR have already been used publicly by the Governor and others. They are an

an essential part of the background but they are not new. (Incidentally it is by now perhaps a little disingenuous to suggest that our EC and FC proposals meet the Chinese side's "two main concerns".) The new points are those in para 3 of Hong Kong TUR and in the same para of your TUR.

Here, particularly while the outcome of the talks is uncertain, we need to strike a careful balance: action aimed primarily at justifying our own opposition to the Chinese approach may not always be best calculated to encourage pressure to build up on the Chinese (including from usually pro-Peking figures) to

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