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JONATHAN MIRSKY
1. Mirsky telephoned on 8 March.
2. His main aim was to probe what the Governor had meant when he had said in LegCo on 5 March (in response to Jimmy McGregor) that although LegCo could amend Legislation put before it, if they did amend an understanding reached between Britain and China this QUOTE would send Britain back to the negotiating table with China to say:
is this amendment acceptable to you? UNQUOTE. Mirsky was inclined to build an elaborate castle in the air on the basis of this sentence, saying that it sounded as if any amendment made by LegCo would have to be subject to Chinese agreement.
3. I said that I thought this a piece of over-analysis of what the Governor had said, leading to a misunderstanding of his meaning. I thought that the Governor's meaning was clear enough: If, after long negotiations, we and the Chinese reached an understanding, and LegCo then decided to amend that, it would only be reasonable for us to go back to the Chinese and establish whether they could accept the amendment. It would then be up to LegCo to take the final decision in the knowledge of Chinese views.
4.
I took the opportunity to twit Mirsky about the Observer editorial of 7 March (which he confirmed he had written):
it was easy enough to set up Aunt Sallys in order to knock them down (QUOTE But Britain must not enter into a secret settlement which ignored the wishes of Hong Kong UNQUOTE>. Who had ever suggested that we would (or even could) do this? Mirsky said that sentences like the one he had quoted from the Governor made him uneasy. He eventually conceded that he did not think that we and
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