TNAG-2761-FCO40-3978-Hong-Kong-Chinese-discrimination-against-UK-companies-Swire-1993 — Page 31

FCO40 Hong Kong Department Records 聯邦事務部香港部檔案 All

Swire China Relations

1.

Swires, in common with most foreign firms, withdrew from China in the early 1950s under pressure from the PRC authorities. Commercial contacts were, of course, maintained in the subsequent decades, but it was not until 1979 that serious dialogue at a very senior level in Peking was started by Swires. The early results of these talks were the commencement of Cathay Pacific services to Shanghai in 1980 and to Peking in 1986; the opening of a Swire office in Peking in 1983; and the signing of an overall joint venture agreement with CITIC in 1985.

Frequent high-level contact was maintained in Beijing, of which the most important meetings, most of which lasted 45 minutes to 1 hour, and which were specific to Swire's business relationship with China, were:-

John Swire met Li Peng March 1985

John Swire, Adrian Swire met Premier Zhao Zhiyang March 1987 Adrian Swire met President Yang Shangkun - April 1989 Adrian Swire met Secretary-General Jiang Zemin June 1991 Adrian Swire met Premier Li Peng June 1991.

Adrian Swire also met various State Council Members including Li Peng in October 1989 and September 1992 in Peking under the aegis of CITIC. Parallel with this, Swire Hong Kong Chinese directors, in particular Yao Kang, were in regular and close touch with seniors in Peking and Shanghai, e.g. Zhu Rong Ji, and with the H.K. and Macao office.

A chronological note of these meetings, itemising those seniors who were present and subsequent business developments, is attached.

The underlying theme of all these meetings from the Chinese was that Peking wanted to do what was best for "the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong", and that we therefore had a common aim.

2. Although these meetings were to some extent ritualistic and did not involve formal negotiation or the signing of agreements, there was nevertheless a strong underlying mutual understanding between the two parties as to what was expected from each side; and a great deal of preliminary and subsequent discussion at varying levels in the Peking hierarchy fleshed out this basic understanding.

3.

From the Chinese side, there was emphasis that, if Hong Kong was to have stability and prosperity post-1997, it needed to remain an international centre, with continuing foreign, and British in particular, investment. Peking had identified Swires (Taikoo) as playing a key role as a British Hong in this because:-

(a) Swire had long experience of dealing with China.

(b)

Swire had shown consistent confidence in investing in Hong Kong.

(c)

Swire had not moved the corporate domicile of Swire Pacific Ltd. or Cathay Pacific Ltd. away from Hong Kong.

(d)

Swire had, fairly unusually for a foreign Hong, trained and promoted Chinese in Hong Kong into the highest reaches of management.

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