TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 75

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conclusion is minimal, (ii) the Chinese reaction to our

breaking-off talks would be more severe than if we

introduced the Bill into LegCo without talks, and (iii) if

talks failed HKG would face a dilemma as to what proposals

to introduce into LegCo.

9. These are matters of judgement which require further discussion. But they may turn out to be moot, since both schools accept that the current mood in the Hong Kong community obliges us to make an effort to get talks underway. It will be difficult to win community support

for introducing the Bill into LegCo unless we can show that

we have made a sincere effort to hold talks. The Chinese

may take this bait, whether or not it is offered willingly.

Both schools also agree that talks are most unlikely to

produce an understanding with China. The remainder of this paper therefore considers how the Chinese might react to non-agreement over electoral issues, and the implications

for our governance of Hong Kong.

What are the Chinese Likely to Do?

10.

Chinese decisions will be affected by a range of

factors, particularly: the nature of the eventual LegCo package and how much they are perceived to have influenced it; the international dimension, particularly the state of their relations with the US; and views within the

leadership in Peking. But there are broadly three levels

of reaction:

They could reserve their position on whether to

allow the LegCo through train to run, and pursue

preparations in fairly low-key of alternative

arrangements.

This is the most optimistic end of

HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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