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issues as the airport, and contracts and franchises. And they would have to decide whether to boycott/disrupt the 1995 elections, or encourage their allies to participate.
They could opt for a policy of wider
non-cooperation. Within that broad approach there would be considerable scope for calibration, on a spectrum from passive
resistance (no answer to our request for
agreement on specific matters in the JLG, no
agreement on airport financing, or land disposals
above the 50 hectares a year laid down in the JLG) to active harassment (not accepting return of illegal immigrants, a blind eye to cross-border criminal activity, harassment of shipping etc). This would probably be combined with efforts to polarise the Civil Service, and undermine the authority of HKG, eg requiring those seeking contracts and franchises to
negotiate with Peking (or possibly the
preparatory apparatus for the post-1997 Hong Kong, which would no doubt mushroom). Even in these circumstances, China would probably maintain contact over financial issues, and
others where it was clearly in their interest to do so. The Chinese would step up the pressure on HMG though retaliation against British business
in China.
10.
On the evidence so far, the third option at present looks the most likely. The prospect is for a difficult
four years, with HKG facing a series of decisions as to how
far it can proceed on specific issues in the absence of Chinese agreement (the airport saga is a foretaste).
HMG
HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH
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