TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 160

RUNNING HONG KONG EFFECTIVELY UP TO JULY 1997:

SECURING FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNDERTAKINGS IN THE JOINT DECLARATION IN ORDER TO PRESERVE, TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE FREEDOMS ND WAY OF LIFE OF HONG KONG PEOPLE AND A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY R HONG KONG AFTER 1997.

II) PARA 3,

DOES NOT SEEM QUITE THE

TI THIRD SENTENCE: 'TRADE-OFFS RIGHT WORD FOR THE QUESTIONS WHICH NEED TO BE EXAMINED IN DISCUSSING POLICY OPTIONS.

III) PARA 3, FIRST TIRET: ''WATERING DOWN'1 IS RATHER EMOTIVE. SOME CHANGES TO THE ORIGINAL PROPOSALS ARE LIKELY WHETHER AS A RESULT OF DEBATE IN LEGCO OR THROUGH NEGOTIATION WITH THE CHINESE. SO THE QUESTION SEEMS RATHER TO BE WHERE WE SET THE LEVEL OF WHAT ''FREE, FAIR AND ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG'' MEANS AS A TARGET FOR US TO AIM FOR (PRESUMABLY WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DECIDE IN ADVANCE EXACTLY WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IN HONG KONG, NOT LEAST BECAUSE FACTORS SUCH AS CHINESE PRESSURE AT THE TIME OF PUBLISHING ANY AMENDED VERSION WOULD HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE).

6. HOW CAN WE ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES? (PARAS 5-8)

I) PARA 6: STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS ONLY SUGGEST THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO HOLD TALKS WITH US ON THEIR TERMS. APART FROM THE QUESTION OF HONG KONG GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION (NOT/NOT ''REPRESENTATION'') WE STILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF SECRECY. ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR MA DID NOT RAISE THIS WITH MR GOODLAD IT REMAINS A LOOSE END.

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II) PARA 7 (I) SECOND SENTENCE: THIS MIGHT BE RIGHT IF TALKS ARE SUCCESSFUL, OR EVEN PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL: EG, IF WE WERE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT SUGGESTIONS MADE BY THE CHINESE SIDE. IF HOWEVER THEY BREAK DOWN WITHOUT ACHIEVING ANYTHING CONCRETE THEN THE FACT OF CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN TALKS WOULD COUNT FOR NOTHING WITH THEM: WITHOUT AGREED RESULTS IT WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT FOR A FACE-SAVER. BUT ONE FURTHER TACTICAL ADVANTAGE OF HOLDING TALKS MIGHT LIE IN THE POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY TO GET THE UNACCEPTABLE PARTS OF THE CHINESE POSITION (EG KEEPING CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS OUT OF LEGCO AT THE NEXT ELECTIONS) FIRMLY ON THE RECORD, SO THAT IT WOULD BE CLEARER TO PUBLIC OPINION WHAT WE ARE REALLY ARGUING ABOUT.

III) PARA 7 (II): A KEY DISADVANTAGE OF HOLDING TALKS IS THAT THE TIMETABLES DO NOT MATCH: WE WANT TO GET ON WITH THINGS, WHILE THE CHINESE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO, AND POSSIBLY AN OBJECTIVE OF, STRINGING THINGS OUT. ONCE TALKS BEGAN WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID A STRUGGLE ABOUT PRINCIPLES BEFORE WE COULD DRAG THE CHINESE INTO DISCUSSION OF PRACTICAL DETAILS. THEY HAVE NO TIME PRESSURE AND WOULD REFUSE TO RECOGNISE A TIME PRESSURE ON US.

IV) PARA 7 (IV): ONE DISADVANTAGE OF PASSING THE INITIATIVE TO LEGCO IS THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BE OUT OF OUR (HMG AND HKG) HANDS BUT WE WOULD BE MORE OR LESS BOUND BY THE OUTCOME: MORE RESPONSIBILITY WITH LESS POWER. MOREOVER THE CHINESE WOULD KEEP MEMBERS OF LEGCO UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE, WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR DEBATE TO PROCEED IN AN ORDERLY WAY.

WHAT ARE THE CHINESE LIKELY TO DO? (PARAS 9-10)

AS SUGGESTED ABOVE GREATER EMPHASIS COULD PERHAPS BE GIVEN TO THE EFFECTS ON CIVIL SERVICE MORALE OF A CONTINUING CAMPAIGN OF CHINESE HOSTILITY. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE CHINESE ARE PREPARED TO UNDERMINE THE LOYALTY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE. HOW WELL WOULD THE CIVIL SERVICE COPE WITH SUCH PRESSURE FROM THE CHINESE, AS THE CLOCK TICKS ON?