TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 137

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alhosting with in JLG, Gila at

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and the hom

of the LegCo debate. The fact of introduction of the legislation into LegCo without prior discussion

with China could well be the trigger for China to

decide on a parting of the ways, and to develop separate arrangements to come into force in 1997 for the legislature. Non-cooperation might extend more widely than this. LegCo might prove incapable of managing the delicate and complex task of building majority support for amended proposals which were

still fair and open, and yet moved in China's

direction.

8.

talks, if they can be arranged on an acceptable basis. They will at a minimum put off the moment at which the

Chinese side decide on an irrevocable parting of the ways

and will thus leave time for views to evolve in Peking and

Hong Kong. They will also demonstrate to Hong Kong opinion that we have tried everything to secure Chinese cooperation, and might moderate the Chinese reaction to the eventual package passed by LegCo. But we should go into such talks with our eyes open: they are most unlikely to produce an understanding. The remainder of this paper therefore considers how the Chinese might react to non-agreement over electoral issues, and the implications

for our governance of Hong Kong.

We conclude that the balance is (just)] in favour of

What are the Chinese Likely to Do?

9.

Chinese decisions will be affected by a range of

factors, particularly: the nature of the eventual LegCo package and how much they are perceived to have influenced it; the international dimension, particularly the state of their relations with the US; and within the leadership in Peking. But there are broadly three levels of reaction:

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HongKongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJK

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