TNAG-2732-FCO40-3938-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 121

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(ii)

The disadvantage of talks is primarily that it is very unlikely that we would be able to reach an acceptable understanding, given the gulf between arrangements which we could accept, and the Chinese conception of the 1995 elections, whereby they would be able to control the outcome at least in a

proportion of the seats. The Chinese also seem to

be planning to use the talks to get a firmer grip on other pre-1997 issues, eg contracts and franchises. They would see to it that talks dragged on for months, and would try to prevent us introducing the legislation during that time. We would therefore face a dilemma, probably in late May: proceed with talks and allow the LegCo timetable to slip until the autumn; or precipitate a breakdown, and dash the expectations which would have built up in Hong Kong while talks were taking place.

(iii) The advantages of passing the initiative to LegCo

are that debate could begin more quickly, with a better prospect of laws reaching the statute book by the summer, in plenty of time for the 1994/95 elections. The Governor's proposals would be put to LegCo without change; there would be no scope for media or Parliamentary criticism of U-turns; and LegCo would be responsible for deciding whether any amendment was necessary to meet Chinese concerns, and if so how much.

(iv)

Against that, the disadvantages of the LegCo-only option are primarily that the Chinese would have had no role in the process. For that reason, and because the Chinese side does not recognise LegCo's right to decide these issues, they would be predisposed to react harshly, whatever the outcome

Hongkongissuesahead/BRIEFS/NJH

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