TNAG-2731-FCO40-3937-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 195

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in any case so vague when it comes down to practical detail, that anything we come up with could easily be dismissed by the Chinese as being inconsistent with the Basic Law (ie their

interpretation of it, which is the only one that counts if we

are to reach agreement with them). I therefore think we should

hold our fire and keep our helpful suggestions for amendment until we have reengaged in some form of consultation with the

Chinese. The best way of filtering these out would be through the process of discussion in LegCo. That way it would look much

less of a climbdown for the Governor. The Hong Kong

administration would need to keep a firm grip on both these

processes to ensure that in the end they meshed to produce a

solution with which both China and Hong Kong can live.

5.

There are two main arguments in favour of offering

amendment now:

i) that this would reduce the level of confrontation with the

Chinese and so dispose them to be more cooperative in agreeing

an outcome acceptable to us. I do not think the second follows

from the first;

ii) the presentation argument, that we would look as if we were

trying. I think this could backfire. We would still be likely

to end up bogged down in legal quibbling about consistency with

the Basic Law and the exchange of letters, without getting any nearer to our political goal, while Hong Kong and business opinion became increasingly fretful.

6.

If the foregoing is correct, none of the models set out in the ExCo paper meets present needs, but they offer useful material from which to construct a satisfactory outcome eventually. I agree that options A and D are preferable to the other two. It is possible that some of the alternative proposals in the 'Compendium', which arrived from Hong Kong yesterday, may provide other useful ingredients.

elec.comm.PR.JRB

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