SECRET
DESKBY
to have realised that LegCo's consideration of the Governor's proposals will take some time, and that in the process the proposals may well be amended in directions they favour. Concern not to damage their relations with the Clinton Administration and anxiety that the steps they had already taken risked damaging Hong Kong's economic future may also have been factors. But we should keep this in perspective. The Chinese fundamentally opposed to the Governor's proposals on functional constituencies and the Election Committee as they stand. If his package was to emerge from LegCo unamended or only marginally amended, we must expect the Chinese to return to confrontation, and at the least to set up the advisory body foreshadowed by Lu Ping. They could well revert to some of the more extreme measures they had earlier contemplated whatever the political and economic cost. We could then face four very difficult years in Hong Kong.
7. In pursing our objective of electoral arrangements for 1995 which are fair, open and command widespread support in Hong Kong, we therefore need to avoid two pitfalls:
amending the Governor's proposals in a way which loses
the support of the liberals in LegCo (without necessarily winning that of other groups) and provokes
serious criticism in Westminster.
winning the battle in LegCo but losing the war, by triggering Chinese hostility and non-cooperation for the remaining years of British rule.
8. Some difficult judgements will be needed in due course. But for the present, the Governor and I consider that we should
proceed as follows.
9.
The Governor should put draft legislation to LegCo as planned
in
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.