TNAG-2730-FCO40-3936-Future-of-Hong-Kong-constitutional-development-1993 — Page 92

SECRET

DESKBY

Easter recess) should be well timed for that: provided that the Chinese do not make a meeting impossible by imposing unacceptable

preconditions.

14. We should not overlook the levers we hold. The main one is

the risk of international pressure on China from Hong Kong's economic partners if the Chinese push too far in Hong Kong. We do not want to exacerbate Chinese conspiracy theories. Our objective should be to ensure that the Chinese would pay a high price in international terms if they damage Hong Kong by their actions - and that they realise it. I proposed that we should follow up the Prime Minister's discussion with President-elect

Clinton to ensure that the new US Administration and Congress understand our views on how the MFN card should be played and what other levers the US might be able to use against China. Other countries could also be encouraged to speak up privately

with China.

15.

In short, our objective remains a set of electoral

arrangements for 1995 which are demonstrably open, fair and

acceptable to the people of Hong Kong. The Governor should put his existing proposals to Leg Co in February, essentially unamended. He and we should continue to emphasise that we welcome alternative proposals and that we will abide by Leg Co's decision on the eventual shape of the package. We should get

across to the Chinese that February will not be the time of decisions and that LegCo could well modify the Governor's

proposals over the following months. We should inform the

Chinese of any additions before they are introduced to LegCo.

shall need to keep this strategy under review in the light of the

debate in Hong Kong and attitudes in Peking.

We

HURD

YYYY