#
CONFIDENTIAL
нив azli
RECEIVE PRE
-F JAY 1997,
NH
FROM:
DATE:
4/1
Cc:
1) p.4. Coush't. Derpt
2) Сору
AR Paul
k Polit Parties
/Meeting Point
(méerfile)
©
4 January 1993 Mr Ricketts, HIKD Mr Llewellyn, GH
Mr Mran
sli
Mr Galsworthy
FRED LI WAH MING (MEETING POINT)
1.
Mr Li told me on 31 December that:
Mr Wae, RAD
2. М.
Morris Mere Say
(a) he sensed that at the grass roots level public support for the Governor's proposals was steadily eroding. This would continue as time went on. Hong Kong people were pragmatic and would not want to see the crusade for democracy pursued at the expense of their own livelihood and standard of living.
(b) he also sensed that more and more people were now looking to China for reassurance about the future. The problem was that Britain could not guarantee Hong Kong's prosperity and stability after 1997. The reality was that Hong Kong's future lay in Chinese hands.
(c) he was certain that LegCo would not pass the Governor's proposals in their entirety. The parts relating to functional constituencies and the election committee would be voted down. The rest would probably go through.
(3) however, he personally remained firmly committed to the package in its entirety. In particular he mentioned the reform of the functional constituency system: he had always been strongly opposed to the old system on the grounds that it was elitist.
(e) Meeting Point would be visiting Peking early in the New Year to explore the possibility of compromise with the Chinese. At this stage, however, he had no idea whether and if so where a compromise could be found.
(f) he was sceptical about the apparently softer line being taken by Lu Ping (this was of course before the Lu Ping interview on TVB). He thought that the main motivation behind the positive signals given to the DAB during their visit was to build up their image in Hong Kong. The underlying Chinese position remained
very hard.
CONFIDENTIAL
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