TNAG-2715-FCO40-3921-House-of-Commons-Select-Committee-on-Foreign-Affairs-enquiry-1993 — Page 63

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5.

The CS agreed that people were

anxious to avoid

problems. But not at any price. He felt that the attituđe

more now

the 1995 elections.

mature. The

There were very

will happen.

Some

of the people towards Hong Kong was great crux will be different views as there will be a

to what great swing towards China. that he would be surprised were this to happen.

6.

Mr Jin

whether

rnock a

on effect

that say

The CS said

the

JLG.

on failure

in the

in the JLG if the.

asked Lester political talks would have Would it be possible to continue work in political talks broke down?

7.

if

The CS felt that there was a good chance that

fail

the to sort out We

the technical to cooperate on nevertheless be able

political

issues

Even

we will

ones.

It was

to see the

how see

it

There had been

It was certainly not in Hong Kong's interests technical issues stall.

was difficult to

would be in the PRC's interests either.

PRC (for example Mr This was obviously to predict

some flavour of this recently in the Jiang Enzhu's "no big deal" comment). not the best solution,

best solution, but it would be wrong chaos and turmoil. It was also important to differentiate between Chinese propaganda and Chinese actions.

the FLG but these could problems in Chinese desired.

be

solved

if

This

was

of also true

the airport.

There were

the

It

would be surprising if this were not sorted out.

8.

Kong

Hong said that people in Mr David Sumberg saii

They needed to be should be involved in the negotiations. prepared for the eventual outcome.

9.

case was

The CS agreed that the way that HKG presented its

successfully

reasonable.

very

important.

If

this could be done

people

would

see

that

we had been very

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