TNAG-2715-FCO40-3921-House-of-Commons-Select-Committee-on-Foreign-Affairs-enquiry-1993 — Page 141

any arrangement especially if they were not a party to it. Moreover they have already prepared alternative administrative arrangements (the so-called 'second stove' or 'second kitchen') for just such an eventuality. Thus Britain could only follow this path if the

the Governor continued to enjoy the support of the majority of the population.

need to parpia

In sum the British government has to choose between the two courses. The first involves making fundamental concessions to the Chinese side in the hope that the British negotiators could fine tune the text of an agreement so as to save face and argue that any agreement is better than none. The second is to pursue its own preferred course along the lines of the Patten proposals in the belief that they conflict with neither Hong Kong's immediate needs nor China's long term interests. The former risks undermining Hong Kong's chances to exercise any meaningful autonomy and the latter risks Chinese unilateralism come 1997 or even before.

I believe that if it has to choose HMG should opt for the second course. Although it may appear to be the more dangerous route it has the superior claim as it does not undermine the basis for the exercise of the "high degree of autonomy" in advance. Additionally, in important respects a more autonomous Hong Kong governed by the rule of law is more in alignment with China's fundamental interests especially as seen by the up and coming generations of leaders in China. It may be argued that this route is contrary to the way that HMG has conducted relations with China over Hong Kong so far. Indeed the basis for reaching the justly praised Joint Declaration in 1984 was precisely by following what has been called here the first route. In the words of one of its chief architects, Sir Percy Cradock, the way should be one 'of quiet but tenacious negotiation with Peking in the interests of Hong Kong, pressing hard, but avoiding open breaches and trials of strength for which Hong Kong will have to pay.' But the circumstances have changed. They have changed in at least two respects: Firstly, Hong Kong's significance for China has changed as a result of the emergence of the economic nexus of 'Greater China' (i.e., the mutual engagement of the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan with the adjacent provinces of southern China); and secondly the ramifications of the ending of the Cold War within China and in the international community point to a Chinese interest in upholding rather than undermining autonomy in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's new importance to China

economy, anyway

1

It has long been recognized that Hong Kong is important to the Chinese economy, but what needs to be appreciated is how this has been enlarged and transformed by several factors since the late 1980s. Hong Kong has become in effect the economic capital of southern China and its reach extends far and wide into all parts of the country. It is at the centre of the fabulous growth rates that China has achieved in the last two years. Hong Kong

3

lens

/rejecte