xxviii
SECOND REPORT FROM
(xviii) We believe that full democracy must be introduced before 1997, and that, consistent with maintaining a necessary degree of continuity, should be introduced as soon as possible. (paragraph 3.10)
(xix) However much we may now believe in the importance of full democracy as soon as possible, we also believe even more strongly that Hong Kong people must be allowed to decide on their own system of government before 1997 as well as after 1997. (paragraph 3.10)
(xx) We recommend that a Green Paper should be published as soon as possible to canvas views on a wide range of issues relating to the electoral law. The results of this exercise should be incorporated into law for the elections in 1991. (paragraph 3.12)
(xxi) Because we believe that full direct elections should be introduced before 1997, and this would mean in effect at the 1995 election, we consider that at the preceding election, in 1991, 50 per cent of the members of the Legislative Council should be directly elected as the first stage of this process. (paragraph 3.14)
(xxii) We believe that the first Chief Executive should be elected by means of an electoral college. Like OMELCO we believe that this electoral college should itself be democrati- cally constituted and should therefore resemble that proposed for the second and third Chief Executives in the second draft of the Basic Law. We believe also that the first Chief Executive should be elected six months before the transfer of sovereignty. The second and subsequent Chief Executives should in our view be elected by universal suffrage. (paragraph 3.18)
(xxiii) Only by making the Legislative Council sovereign can the people of Hong Kong be confident that the Hong Kong SAR will have "a system of government, the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong," and which reflects the promise of a high degree of autonomy made in the Joint Declaration. (paragraph 3.22)
IV British Policy and Actions
(xxiv) The progress and prosperity of Hong Kong is of enormous importance to the United
Kingdom and to British interests. (paragraph 4.3)
(xxv) At the root of Britain's special obligation to Hong Kong is the unique position of Hong Kong as a British dependent territory whose people are not able to exercise the fundamental right of self-determination. We consider that the Joint Declaration with the unprecedented promise of "one country, two systems” and the continuation of the capitalist system in Hong Kong, met that unique obligation in the first instance. (paragraph 4.6)
(xxvi) In summary, we are recommending two separate systems of assurances to the people of Hong Kong. (paragraph 4.13). First we recommend that the British Government should take the lead at the earliest opportunity, particularly with our EC partners and immigrant receiving countries such as Australia, Canada and the USA in establishing the definite guarantees which could be put into place in the years ahead. We believe the accommodation of even several million people from Hong Kong would be quite possible if shared amongst the international community. (paragraph 4.15). The second system of assurances would be available, in addition to the first, to certain specific categories. Its clear objective is to ensure that identified key personnel are given the confidence to stay in post during the period to 1997 and, we hope, beyond. We believe such assurances could be provided to a significant number of Hong Kong BDTCs in key positions. (paragraph 4.19). We recommend that these assurances, that they will be able to come to Britain, should they so wish, to settle free of immigration controls, should be given before 1997 to a larger number of key people in the Hong Kong civil service, the police or indeed in any area of public life (paragraph 4.21). The assurances under this scheme could be taken up either at 1997 or at any point thereafter, before, at or after retirement (paragraph 4.21). We recognise that section 4(5) of the British Nationality Act 1981 was intended to be used "sparingly” but this should give ample scope for it to be used far more generously in the future than it has been hitherto, and the Home Office should make a clear policy statement that this is what they intend to do (paragraph 4.21). We recommend that the approximately 30 war widows are given immediate assurances that they will be welcome to come to the
* White Paper on the Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, November 1984.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.